Defendant’s initial detention on mistaken belief he was a wanted man was valid, but the subsequent frisk was not because the officer then had reason to believe defendant was not the wanted man

Bailbondsman was the citizen informant on defendant’s stop, but the bondsman mistook defendant for another person. The stop and detention was reasonable at its inception, but a frisk was not because the officer did not have sufficient reason to know that defendant was the wanted man. A search incident was not justified either because there was no probable cause for an arrest. State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 168 P.3d 1019 (2007):

The totality of the information available to the officer at the time he conducted the frisk raised a reasonable suspicion that the man he was detaining might be J.H and the subject of the outstanding warrant. We cannot conclude, however, that there was sufficient information for a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the man being detained was actually J.H. and that his arrest pursuant to the warrant was reasonable absent further investigation. Therefore, we conclude that probable cause to arrest Baxter did not exist prior to the frisk of his person, and the frisk cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest.

Excessive force claim against officers by plaintiff who was convicted of resisting was barred by Heck. Alternatively, the officers had qualified immunity. Plaintiff had a seizure disorder which led to them believing she was resisting, and she was convicted of a related offense. Ryan v. Hazel Park, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29237 (E.D. Mich. April 20, 2007).*

Search warrant for premises authorized search of defendant’s bedroom wihtin the premises. United States v. Harrison, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29337 (W.D. Va. April 20, 2007)*:

Instead, the evidence before the court shows that the entire residence was rented by Harrison. There is no evidence that Harrison’s access to the room used by St. Pierre was limited in any way. In particular, there was no evidence that the room had a separate entrance or that the door to the room had a lock, which allowed restricted access to the room. That being the case, I find that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the search of St. Pierre’s room because I find that the search warrant at issue described the place to be searched with the necessary particularity and was supported by a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Canestri, 518 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1975) (search warrant for a single-family residence cannot be frustrated by a declaration that one of the rooms belongs to a party not named in the warrant); United States v. Jordan, 349 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1965) (search of entire residence pursuant to warrant reasonable where no indication that residence had been divided into more than one living unit and one person rented the entire residence); see also United States v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1480 (9th Cir. 1991) (a search warrant for the entire premises of a single family residence is valid notwithstanding the fact that it was issued based on information regarding the alleged illegal activities of one of several occupants of the residence). Therefore, I recommend that the court deny the Motion insofar as it seeks to suppress any evidence seized from St. Pierre’s bedroom in the search of 330 Lowry Drive pursuant to this search warrant.