The police received a silent 911 hangup call, and cars were dispatched to the area. Because no information was provided, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop cars in the area of the call, so the government failed in its burden of showing reasonable suspicion. The court also compares the quality and nature of information from 911 calls in the cases. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2007):
We believe that the 911 hang-up call, standing alone without follow-up calls by a dispatcher or other information, is most analogous to an anonymous tip. The Supreme Court has noted that “there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.'” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)). For example, an anonymous tip that accurately predicts a subject’s future behavior in detail can be credited with “a special familiarity with [the subject’s] affairs” and thus bears sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. at 332. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that an anonymous tip does not exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability merely because it provides “[a]n accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance,” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, as such a tip “provide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility,” id. at 271. See also United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 370-72 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the holding of J.L. to similar circumstances); Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 849-50 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 381-83 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 955, 152 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2002). Such a tip is not irrelevant in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, but should be given little weight. See Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 465-66.
. . .
The silent 911 hang-up call also did not provide a description of Cohen or his car and thus did not identify any determinate person. The quick response of Officers Pender and Koenig made it possible to limit those potentially related to the silent 911 hang-up call to those people and vehicles within four minutes of the area surrounding Wooded Glen Court, and the early hour limited the number of people in that general area, but those limitations still fall short of identifying a determinate person. Cf. United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 247-52 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop two men in the area of a robbery based solely on a general description provided by a robbery victim that the perpetrators were two black men of a particular age and height wearing hooded sweatshirts).
Some courts have concluded that an emergency 911 report is more reliable than an anonymous tip and may, by itself, supply reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, at least when the caller identifies himself or herself. See United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1174-77 (9th Cir. 2004); cf. Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 253-55 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that an emergency 911 report combined with police officers’ observations of a man bleeding, acting belligerently, and demanding assistance from paramedics justified warrantless entry into a home on the basis of exigent circumstances). Even if we were to assume that an anonymous 911 report is more reliable than other similar anonymous tips, however, we believe that the virtually complete lack of information conveyed by the silent 911 hang-up call and the total absence of corroborating evidence indicating that criminal activity was afoot requires us to give the 911 hang-up call little weight in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.
Validity of a traffic stop is not based on the factual accuracy of what the officer was relying on, but on the objective reasonableness of the belief that there was a traffic offense committed. United States v. Hampton, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27159 (W.D. Pa. April 12, 2007):
Ultimately, the Delfin-Colina court concluded that “[t]aken together, then, Terry and Whren stand for the proposition that a traffic stop will be deemed a reasonable “seizure” when an objective review of the facts shows that an officer possessed specific, articulable facts that an individual was violating a traffic law at the time of the stop. In other words, an officer need not be factually accurate in her belief that a traffic law had been violated but, instead, need only produce facts establishing that she reasonably believed that a violation had taken place.” Id. at 398.
Reasonable suspicion to stop led to a plain view that led to a vehicle search on probable cause. United States v. Naylor, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27202 (E.D. Pa. April 12, 2007).*
Pro se motion to dismiss for outrageous police misconduct based on same grounds as suppression hearing already heard when defendant had counsel was rejected as “plow[ing] the same ground.” United States v. Cochran, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27093 (N.D. Ind. April 10, 2007).*
Franks challenge failed. It was clear that the Postal Inspector was confused by some of the questions put to her, and it did not rise to the level of a Franks challenge. The defense also overstated the issue and apparently lost credibility with the court. United States v. Vilar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26993 (S.D. N.Y. April 4, 2007):
That Inspector Fraterrigo was confused was both obvious and understandable given the nature and form of some of the questions asked of her. Moreover, the Defendants’ notion that Inspector Fraterrigo freely admitted, under oath, that she lied to a magistrate judge and then executed what she knew to be a patently invalid warrant by seizing items that she had no basis to take is too fanciful even for a bad Hollywood courtroom drama. Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ claim that Inspector Fraterrigo, in open court, admitted to intentionally misleading a magistrate judge in order to obtain and execute an illegal warrant. She testified to just the opposite, and the Court found this testimony to be credible.
This same case appears in the later posting just above these for more issues.
