Plaintiff was arrested at the El Paso airport after TSA found a white powdery substance in his luggage in clear bags. He said it was laundry detergent. He was held for six days, got a perfunctory hearing within 48 hours in which he did not participate, and then it was discovered that there was no contraband in his luggage. The district court finds that there was no constitutional violation, and the perfunctory hearing did not violate the constitution, even if it violated Texas law. Finally, even if there was a colorable claim, the officers had qualified immunity. Bittakis v. City of El Paso, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24429 (W.D. Tex. March 13, 2007). Comment: The moral? Don’t carry laundry soap in your luggage such that it looks like cocaine. How? Beats me.
Court finds that search occurred after 6 a.m., so Rule 41 was not violated. And, in dicta, the court says that a violation of the 6 a.m. start time would not necessarily warrant suppression because that would not necessarily be a constitutional violation, citing Hudson. United States v. Carling, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24431 (D. Conn. March 22, 2007).*
Informant’s information about defendant’s home was largely corroborated by the police, so there was pobable cause for the search warrant. United States v. Shofner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24498 (D. Minn. February 21, 2007).*
Questioning by one officer with others standing around would not lead a reasonable person to believe that he was seized. State v. Wood, 218 S.W.3d 596 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007):
Defendant asserts that he was seized because he was alone in the parking lot with several officers present, and he was questioned without being told he could refuse to answer and leave anytime. Neither assertion is persuasive. While it is true that several officers arrived at the scene to assist Gordon, no one except Millirons interacted with Defendant. Millirons never displayed his weapon during the encounter. Prior to initiating the search, Millirons did not physically touch Defendant. He was handcuffed only after Millirons felt the metal pipe, which he immediately recognized as drug paraphernalia. At that point, Millirons had probable cause to arrest Defendant. See State v. Vanacker, 759 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Mo. App. 1988). According to Millirons, he did not threaten or coerce Defendant to make him answer questions. In our view, the language used by Millirons in questioning Defendant would not indicate to a reasonable person that compliance with the officer’s requests might be compelled. Finally, it is well settled an officer is not required to inform a citizen that he or she is free to leave or refuse to respond to questions before the encounter can be deemed consensual. Shoults, 159 S.W.3d at 446-47; State v. Day, 87 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Mo. App. 2002); Rowe, 67 S.W.3d at 655-56; State v. Scott, 926 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Mo. App. 1996).
In sum, the trial court concluded that the encounter between Defendant and Millirons was consensual.
Comment: Once again, a court finds a citizen would not feel seized when a bunch of officers are standing near him and he is being questioned by one. What a court finds a reasonable person would understand in police-citizen interactions is not what a reasonable person would actually believe is happening because such interactions are inherently coercive.
