Tribal police conducting searches on casino property are governed by the Fourth Amendment

A California Indian tribe running a casino used tribal police for security. They conducted an illegal search in the parking garage, and the superior court suppressed. The state appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2), the tribal officers are governed by the Fourth Amendment. People v. Ramirez, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1464, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631 (3d Dist. 2007):

Thus, by act of Congress, Indian tribal governments have no more power to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures than do the federal and state governments under the Fourth Amendment. n8 The question is whether in extending the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to Indian tribal governments through its enactment of section 1302(2), Congress also intended that the exclusionary rule which unquestionably applies to evidence obtained by federal and state law enforcement officers in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments would likewise apply to evidence seized by tribal police officers in violation of section 1302(2).

Illegal stop led to officer running the defendant’s name which produced a warrant for his arrest. The existence of the warrant attenuated the stop from the arrest. Falls v. State, 953 So. 2d 627 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2007).

A discretionary impoundment of defendant’s vehicle by the officer was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and an inventory based on the impoundment was valid. “Less intrusive means” to the impoundment are not constitutionally required. City of Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St. 3d 67, 2007 Ohio 1103, 862 N.E.2d 810 (2007):

Defendant argues that he could have been permitted to call a tow truck himself as an alternative to impoundment. The Bertine court observed that although giving the defendant in that case an opportunity to make alternative arrangements for his vehicle would have been possible, “‘[t]he reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative “less intrusive” means.'” [Bertine,] at 373-374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, quoting Illinois v. Lafayette (1983), 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65.

Similarity between defendant and his brother led police to detain them while they sorted out which was which, and that led to a search of the one without a warrant producing paraphernalia. The search was valid because it was not unreasonable in these circumstances. Trial court’s suppression order reversed. State v. Xiong, 154 P.3d 318 (2007):

Given the similarity in appearance between Kheng Xiong and Bee Xiong, the time necessary to clarify their initial identification, Bee Xiong’s location at Kheng Xiong’s home, the bulge in Bee Xiong’s pocket, his reaction when an agent tried to touch it, and the officer’s stated safety concerns, the agent was justified in frisking Bee Xiong’s pocket. Based on the hardness and shape of the object, the agent was justified in pulling the object out. See State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 113, 874 P.2d 160 (1994) (if a pat-down search is inconclusive and the officer feels an object which might be a weapon, he is entitled to withdraw it for examination).

In sum, given the propriety of the initial stop and the stated need to dispel the agent’s safety concerns during the ensuing investigation, the evidence seized incident to Bee Xiong’s arrest was incorrectly suppressed under well established principles governing frisks during investigatory stops.