CA2: Shooting dog during raid was a “seizure” and reasonable on the facts

Shooting of a dog during a raid was a seizure, but here it was reasonable because the jury could have concluded that no amount of training would have prevented shooting a dog coming at the police to attack them. Carroll v. County of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013):

As a number of our sister circuits have already concluded, the unreasonable killing of a companion animal constitutes an unconstitutional “seizure” of personal property under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 204-05 (4th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001); Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 151 (8th Cir. 1994). To determine whether a seizure is unreasonable, a court must “balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion” and determine whether “the totality of the circumstances justified [the] particular sort of … seizure.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have long held that the plaintiff has the burden to prove that a seizure was unreasonable. See Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1991).

There is no dispute that Deputy Carroll’s shooting of the plaintiff’s dog was a severe intrusion given the emotional attachment between a dog and an owner. See San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Hells Angels”). On the other hand, ensuring officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence are particularly significant governmental interests. Additionally, courts have held that, at least in some circumstances, it is reasonable for an officer to shoot a dog that he believes poses a threat to his safety or the safety of the community. See, e.g., Altman, 330 F.3d at 205-06; Brown, 269 F.3d at 210-11. The key question, then, is whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff had failed to prove that Deputy Carroll’s actions were unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

A reasonable jury certainly could have found—based on the evidence presented—that no amount of planning or training would have changed the unfortunate outcome in this case. The plaintiff offered no evidence that any non-lethal means of controlling her dog would have allowed the officers to quickly escape the “fatal funnel” and effectively execute the no-knock warrant. In other words, the jury could have reasonably found that Deputy Carroll would still have needed to shoot the plaintiff’s dog even if the officers had developed a non-lethal plan to restrain the dog.