There is no per se rule on there being exigent circumstances in a domestic disturbance. This one involved a “commotion.” United States v. Sikut, 488 F. Supp. 2d 291 (W.D. N.Y. 2007):
The Second Circuit has recognized the “combustible nature of domestic disputes,” which provides “great latitude to an officer’s belief that warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances when the officer had substantial reason to believe that one of the parties to the dispute was in danger.” Tierney, 133 F.3d at 197. However, courts have held that domestic violence situations are not per se exigent, United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 719 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 542, 166 L. Ed. 2d 401 (2006), and that “there is no domestic abuse exception to the Fourth Amendment, generally.” United States v. Black, 466 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit has upheld an officer’s determination that exigent circumstances, based on asserted domestic violence, were present where the anonymous call was made by the victim from the location to which police were responding. Anthony, 339 F.3d at 136-37. Specifically, in that case the court found that the substance of the 911 call created exigent circumstances because the caller expressed the belief that she faced “an immediate and deadly threat of harm.” Id. Here, the 911 call was placed by a neighbor who refused to identify herself, not by the alleged victim, nor from a person within the potential victim’s residence. Gov’t Exh. 1; Tr.I 15; Tr.II 334-36.
Additionally, contrary to the facts in Anthony, supra, the information provided by the 911 caller in the instant case was not unambiguously indicative of a recent domestic dispute involving personal violence. Rather, the 911 caller stated that “some degree of commotion” daily transpires at the residence and asserted that the noise “sounds like a physical fight, you can hear people going at the walls, rumbling down the stairs ….” Gov’t Exh. 1. When Stephens spoke with the neighbor, she described “family arguments” as occurring at the apartment. Tr.II 133. Although as described by the neighbor, such sounds may have been caused by “family argument[s]”, they are also consistent with people noisily running up or down stairs, and loud and even offensive talking.
That it was objectively unreasonable for the investigating officers to conclude exigent circumstances justified their warrantless entry of the Sikut residence is tellingly supported by the relevant transcript of the 911 call which demonstrates, unequivocally, contrary to the Government’s contention, that, upon arriving at the scene, Stephens did not believe that the elderly couple residing at the apartment were in imminent danger. Rather, according to his own statement to the dispatcher, Stephens believed, prior to the warrantless entry at issue, that the unidentified caller was probably incorrect in believing that a domestic disturbance at the Sikut apartment had occurred when she telephoned 911, on March 20, 2005, even stating to the 911 dispatcher that the elderly couple “should be alright.” Gov’t Exh. 1.
Plaintiff’s plea to a lesser offense precluded litigating the question of probable cause for his arrest for the greater offense, too. Corvin v. Bice, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17314 (E.D. Tenn. March 9, 2007), all without citing Heck v. Humphrey:
[S]tate court proceeding is accorded preclusive effect in a later § 1983 suit in federal court so long as the state court proceeding met minimal standards of due process. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 871. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence he suffered a deprivation of due process in the state court criminal proceedings. Plaintiff’s guilty plea in state court and the imposition of fines by that court estop his assertions in this Court that Defendant officers acted without probable cause and consequently, his Fourth Amendment claim of false arrest. Walker, 854 F.2d at 142; Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir.1998); Stemler, 126 F.3d at 871; Donovan, 105 F.3d at 297-98; Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 175 (6th Cir.1987)(abrogated on other grounds Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994)); Wilson v. Johnson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39311, 2005 WL 2417057 at *7-9. n12
The Court concludes it is bound by the state court decision that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and consequently, his Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest and imprisonment are precluded. As noted above, the Court did not consider Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion (Court File No. 23) since it was untimely filed. However, even if the Court had considered Plaintiff’s response before making its ruling, it still would have granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these issues since Plaintiff admits the granting of summary judgment is proper concerning his false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on these issues will be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims will be DISMISSED as to all Defendants.
Defendant’s request for a Franks hearing failed because his moving papers attack the statements of two persons they believed were the unreliable confidential informations, but they were not the informants. The two informants provided significant corroborating information. United States v. Makki, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17413 (E.D. Mich. March 13, 2007).*
Civil case over entry for alleged drinking of minors did not state a claim because there was probable cause. The plaintiffs did not challenge the statute was unconstitutional. “Whether or not a minor is in possession of an alcoholic beverage just by being in the house is a question for a court to decide. There is no indication that an arrest under such circumstances is without probable cause.” Most of the plaintiffs do not have standing because they did not live in the house that was entered. Cooper v. City of Woodville, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17199 (E.D. Tex. March 12, 2007).*
