Payton‘s reasonable belief arrestee is inside can be created by actions of others

For a “reasonable belief” under Payton, it is not required that officers actually see the suspect. Actions of others can create such a belief. United States v. Foutch, 219 Fed. Appx. 774 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished):

The first prong is satisfied because there is no dispute that the trailer was Mr. Foutch’s home. The second prong is also satisfied because the deputies had a “reasonable belief” that Mr. Foutch was in the residence. Id. In Valdez, this court concluded that officers entering a suspect’s dwelling with an arrest warrant need not have actual knowledge that he is home; rather, they must have an “objectively reasonable” belief that he is present. Id. The court emphasized that “actual viewing of the suspect on the premises is not required. Indeed, the officers may take into account the fact that a person involved in criminal activity may be attempting to conceal his whereabouts.” Id. at 1226 (citation omitted).

Here, the district court found that Ms. Shatto’s equivocating responses to the deputies’ questions about Mr. Foutch’s whereabouts gave them a reasonable basis to believe he was lurking in the trailer.

In a similar case, the C.D. Ill. holds that the standard for entry of a third person’s home with a warrant is reasonable suspicion and not probable cause. Covington v. United States Department of Justice, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16872 (C.D. Ill. March 8, 2007).

Prison search and strip search claims fail. Monroe v. Beard, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16943 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 2007):

During the search of their cells, prison officers strip searched plaintiffs in their cells, ordered them to dress, handcuffed them and made them stand outside the cells while the officers searched inside. Plaintiff Collins states that an officer inserted a finger in his rectum during the search. These allegations do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The Eighth Amendment forbids the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that is without penological justification. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-738 (2002) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)). Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not establish that they were subjected to unnecessary pain during the August 4, 2005 search of their cells. The methods used by SCI-Graterford to conduct the search fall into well-established parameters. The Eighth Amendment excludes de minimus uses of physical force. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.”). The type of search conducted here–handcuffing a prisoner, removing him from his cell, and strip-searching him–is a de minimus intrusion that does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Ostrander v. Horn, 145 F. Supp. 2d 614, 618-19 (M.D. Pa. 2001) aff’d 49 Fed. Appx. 391 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Hill v. Blum, 916 F. Supp. 470, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (pat search of the genital area does not implicate the Eighth Amendment).

Plaintiffs cannot claim any violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has determined that a prisoner does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell and therefore “the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Searches of inmates and their cells are necessary to ensure the security of the prison and the safety of all inmates. Id. at 529. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment does not protect an inmate from seizures of his property. Id. at 528-29. Nor does it protect inmates from visual cavity searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979) (affirming the use of post-visitation body cavity searches that required male inmates to lift their genitals and bend over and spread their buttocks for visual inspection).

Off-duty California officers have the authority to arrest. United States v. Fay, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947 (E.D. Cal. February 23, 2007).

Informant may be corroborated by information that is not itself criminal. United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16846 (D. N.M. February 5, 2007).