The defendant was stopped before Canadian customs in the Detroit-Windsor tunnel and asked about whether defendant knew of the reporting requirement when taking more than $10,000 in cash without filing a report. Defendant said he was going to the Windsor casino and had only $300 on him. The officer told him again about the reporting requirement, and defendant again denied having more than $10,000 on him. The defendant’s demeanor made the officer send him to secondary inspection, where $171,000 was found. The stop was valid. United States v. Alinj, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14054 (E.D. Mich. January 30, 2007).
Smell of marijuana from passenger compartment after an uncorroborated BOLO and a valid traffic stop coupled with furtive movements gave cause to search the interior and the trunk. Kimball v. State, 951 So. 2d 35 (1st Dist. 2007).
Affidavit for search warrant justified a search of two residences owned by defendant next to each other for computers with child pornography on them. They were easily transportable and could have been in either or both buildings. State v. Samson, 2007 ME 33, 916 A.2d 977 (2007):
[*P18] Here, as the trial court observed, it would have been better practice had the detective clarified in the affidavit how the events were connected to each of Samson’s residences, described why he believed the computers and other electronics might be found in both homes, and articulated that Samson had control over both residences. However, the evidence and instrumentalities sought were easily transportable, the residences to be searched were close enough to facilitate transfer of evidence from one place to the other, and the suspect was alleged to have owned both buildings. A common sense reading of the affidavit supports the inference that the police were likely to find evidence of the collection and production of sexually explicit images of minors in both buildings. Thus, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit sets forth sufficient probable cause to justify the searches of both residences. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Samson’s first motion to suppress.
Defendant consented to a search after a traffic stop, and that consent permitted officer to remove a hidden panel he discovered. United States v. Dillon, 223 Fed. Appx. 687 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
Prevailing officers in § 1983 jury trial over an alleged illegal search were not entitled to attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Miller v. City of Tooele, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14673 (D. Utah March 1, 2007):
Similarly, Defendant Hewitt’s directed verdict does not justify awarding attorneys’ fees. Joining Defendant Niesporek arguments, Defendant Hewitt has previously moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motions. (July 27, 2005 Order & Mem. Dec. (dkt. # 38); Aug. 14, 2006 Am. Order & Mem. Dec. (dkt. # 104).) During trial, the court granted Defendant Hewitt’s motion for a directed verdict because Mr. Miller did not offer evidence that Defendant Hewitt personally violated the Fourth Amendment. But a directed verdict does not establish that Mr. Miller’s claims qualify as “vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n.2. The court finds that Defendant Hewitt does not satisfy the substantial burden to merit attorneys’ fees.
The right to file a motion to reconsider does not give the parties the right to seek new grounds for relief. United States v. Loya, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14704 (D. Neb. February 28, 2007):
My order denying the defendants’ motion to suppress is not a final judgment, and therefore I am free to reconsider it. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985); United States v. Torres-Luna, No. 06-CR-72-LRR, 2006 WL 3254538, at *2 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Rouse v. United States, 359 F.2d 1014, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“A pre-trial ruling on a motion to suppress does not bind the trial judge in all circumstances.”). However, the fact that I have the authority to reconsider a motion to suppress does not mean that the parties have unfettered leave to raise untimely arguments concerning the motion. On the contrary, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide,
“A party waives any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, or request not raised by the deadline the court sets under Rule 12(c) or by any extension the court provides. For good cause, the court may grant relief from the waiver.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C) (listing “a motion to suppress evidence”); United States v. Looking, 156 F.3d 803, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s [untimely] motion to amend [his motion to suppress] and deem[ing] defendant’s involuntariness argument waived”). Nor are parties given unlimited time to file objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (providing that parties are given ten days to object to a magistrate judge’s recommendation); NeCrimR. 57.3 (same); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2) (“Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review.”). In short, a party seeking to reopen argument on a motion to suppress must present me with a good reason for exercising my discretion to do so.
The scope of a warrantless search based on consent, express or implied, is controlled by the suspect. If the officers exceed the scope of the consent, that part is invalid. State v. Poulton, 37 Kan. App. 2d 299, 152 P.3d 678 (2007).
“[W]here an officer smells a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside a stopped automobile; the driver admitted that his passenger had smoked marijuana in the car; and marijuana was found in the possession of the passenger, the officer had probable cause to search the driver for possession of drugs. When these facts are coupled with the exigencies of being alone with two suspects and confronted with the real possibility of the loss of evidence, the circumstances of this case support the warrantless search performed, and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress.” [syllabus by the court] State v. Fewell, 37 Kan. App. 2d 283, 152 P.3d 1249 (2007).*
