W.D.Pa.: Reasonable suspicion is the standard for a vehicle stop, not probable cause

Reasonable suspicion is the standard for a vehicle stop, not probable cause. United States v. Gooch, 915 F. Supp. 2d 690 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. December 28, 2012):

Defendant Gooch argues that the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of a traffic stop based on an observed motor vehicle code violation is probable cause. (See Doc. No. 176 at 2-3). Indeed, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), the Supreme Court stated that “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” As explained in United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396-97 (3rd Cir. 2006), however, the phrase “probable cause” was used in response to the situation before the Supreme Court and did not alter “the longstanding reasonable suspicion standard recognized in the traffic-stop setting.” The Third Circuit subsequently held that “the Terry reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops.” Id. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), which Defendant Gooch cites in support of his argument that the probable cause standard applies, does not alter this standard. In Brendlin, the Court held that when a police officer makes a traffic stop, a passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. Id. at 251. In explaining its decision, the Court, citing Whren, compared precedent stating that at least articulable and reasonable suspicion is required to support random, investigative traffic stops and that an automobile stop is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Id. at 263 n.7. The Court did not, however, draw a distinction between the two types of stops, establish that different standards apply for different types of stops, or suggest that the probable cause language quoted from Whren represented the minimum standard that must be met to render lawful a stop based on a belief that a traffic violation has occurred. See id. Additionally, the Third Circuit has continued to apply the reasonable suspicion standard to stops premised on motor vehicle code violations since Brendlin. See, e.g., United States v. Comegys, No. 11-3630, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23364, at *8 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 2012); United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3rd Cir. 2012); Johnson, 452 Fed. Appx. at 225; United States v. Johnson, 434 Fed. Appx. 159, 162 (3rd Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, for the same reasons that support the Court’s conclusion that Corporal Johnson’s decision to stop Defendants’ vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion, the Court also finds that Corporal Johnson’s decision to stop Defendants’ vehicle was supported by probable cause. Therefore, the traffic stop here was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment even under the more demanding probable cause standard.