Defendant’s sister had apparent authority to consent to a search of her car being driven by the defendant stopped 228 miles away. Defendant implied that if the police wanted to search the car, they had to get consent from the owner, so they did. United States v. Buckles, 220 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Defendant who opened his garage door did not waive his expectation of privacy in the garage. State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 155 P.3d 1157 (2007):
The State’s argument unnecessarily expands Santana. Jenkins opened an otherwise enclosed garage to gain access to his home. His exposure of the garage to public view was temporary and is more analogous to the opening of a door to a private home than to the continued, knowing display of a walkway, driveway, or open porch where visitors are expected to go. See State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 623, 768 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1989) (differentiating between a “public” unenclosed porch and an enclosed porch indistinguishable from the attached home). A garage with a large door that exposes much of a garage’s interior when open is admittedly different from a house; nevertheless, an attached, enclosed garage is typically an area where people expect privacy and expect to secure their possessions and perform private activities away from public view. While it is true that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy as to observations which can be made from a driveway impliedly open to public use, this is limited by the principle that police officers without a warrant are only permitted the same level of intrusion as one would expect from a reasonably respectful citizen. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147, 953 P.2d at 587. Moreover, a privacy interest is not destroyed simply because an officer has open view into an area. See State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313, 859 P.2d 344, 349 (Ct. App. 1993) citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 n. 4 (1983) (“An open view observation alone, absent exigent circumstances or other Fourth Amendment justification, does not authorize a warrantless seizure or entry into an area where a privacy interest does exist. However, what is seen in open view may furnish probable cause for obtaining a warrant.”). Jenkins’ garage was part and parcel of the structure constituting his home, and was secured with a door closed at the time police arrived at the home. On the facts of this case, Jenkins had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his temporarily opened attached garage, and this space was subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
Driving too slow was not reasonable suspicion in itself. State v. Bacher, 2007 Ohio 727, 170 Ohio App. 3d 457, 867 N.E.2d 864 (1st Dist. 2007).* Comment: The court felt compelled to use this as the second heading:
II. The Fourth Amendment Applies Even to Fools
The court never says anything thereafter that relates to this heading. The subject matter comes from the preceding paragraph which the court obviously felt compelled to include:
Because this case concerns whether Norton’s initial traffic stop was supported by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, the facts after the initial stop are inconsequential. But given the arrogance of Bacher’s post-arrest antics, we feel compelled to address some of his apparent delusions, misconceptions, and concerns: (1) this decision was not reached as a result of influence on the part of Bacher’s “father in law, Judge Spiegel”; (2) to our knowledge, Officer Norton has not been fired from the Blue Ash Police Department for pulling Bacher over, as was threatened; (3) Bacher’s in-cruiser statements that he “was not driving all that fast” were exceedingly candid–especially when Officer Norton told him numerous times that she had pulled him over for driving too slowly, not for speeding; (4) Bacher questioned Officer Norton about impounding him, but in Ohio, we impound cars and incarcerate people; (5) the record fails to show that Bacher was in any way being treated like a “terrorist”–in fact, Officer Norton was quite attentive to Bacher’s needs despite his brash demeanor; and (6) contrary to Bacher’s belief, the Ohio Revised Code provides that vehicles be impounded by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and not the American Automobile Association. Clearly Bacher “had the right to remain silent, but not the ability.”n2
n2 See Ron White, Tater Salad.
Defendant’s third party consent claim argument that the third party “was so stoned that any consent to enter was not intelligently made” was rejected. On the totality, the record supported that it was. Also, it is not determinative that he did not know of the right to refuse consent. State v. Loyer, 2007 Ohio 716, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 659 (8th Dist. February 22, 2007).*
