Probation search: Where no elaborate state regulations, “special needs” are not at issue, and totality standard with a reasonable suspicion requirement applies

Illinois does not have an elaborate regulatory structure for its probationers, unlike in Griffin and Samson, so the “special needs” exception does not come into play. Instead, the totality standard with a reasonable suspicion standard of Knights applies. While the probationer still has a reduced expectation of privacy, the search here lacked any reasonable suspicion and was invalid. People v. Ward, 308 Ill. Dec. 899, 862 N.E.2d 1102 (1st Dist. 2007).

In a Texas state § 1983 case, the plaintiff stated enough to survive summary judgment on the legality of the search and seizure and qualified immunity. The case started with a “civil assist” of a “bad breakup” which led the police to enter the plaintiff’s property and assist in taking things. The officers were on notice that they were conducting a search and seizure and that it was contrary to plaintiff’s rights. Poteet v. Sullivan, 218 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 2007) (substituted opinion on rehearing).*

Plaintiff sued claiming that a search warrant for his house in relation to an administrative search of his business was void for lack of a showing of nexus to the business. Partial summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff on that claim. Lister v. Schnitzius, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8064 (N.D. Cal. January 23, 2007).*

The fact that a police car’s blue lights remain on after the stop is completed is not proof that the defendant was not free to leave after he was told he was free to leave. [The lights also serve a safety function.] State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 152 P.3d 16 (Ida. 2007).

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