Departing from some recent cases in other circuits, the District of New Mexico, following Tenth Circuit law, held that the driver of a rental car rented by another, but with permission of the renter, has no standing to challenge it search. United States v. Fox, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95233 (D. N.M. October 29, 2006):
With respect to a defendant attempting to invoke the Fourth Amendment, who was in sole possession and control of a car rented by a third party at the time of search, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that such a defendant does not have standing to challenge search or seizure of the car. See United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 871 (citing United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1984)). In United States v. Obregon, the Tenth Circuit included the following district court language in its holding:
“Defendant had the keys to the car and may have had permission from the renter of the car to use it, but this is not determinative of the standing inquiry in this case. Defendant was driving a rented vehicle and was not named on the rental agreement or any other documents, either as the renter or as an authorized driver. Defendant made no showing that any arrangement had been made with the rental car company that would have allowed him to drive the car legitimately. Indeed, the defendant testified that he waited outside of Miami airport while an unrelated third party arranged the rental of the car. Defendant’s relationship to the rented car is too attenuated to support a claim of standing.”
748 F.2d at 1374. See United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 886-87 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting the same district court passage approvingly and relying on it to hold that a defendant, who it was established at a hearing on a motion to suppress borrowed the rental car in question from the lessee, his common-law wife, and who the rental car company had not authorized to drive the car, had no standing to invoke the Fourth Amendment).
Comment: There is a split in the circuits on this issue, so don’t be surprised if the Supreme Court takes this issue in the next couple of years.
It was necessary to handcuff plaintiff during his arrest, but he would not submit. “By [plaintiff’s] own admission, [the officer] was unable to put the handcuffs on him while [plaintiff] remained upright, and thus, it was both reasonable and necessary to take [him] to the ground in order to secure him.” Summary judgment granted. Moore v. Vangelo, 222 Fed. Appx. 167 (3d Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
“A reasonably competent police officer might rely without investigation on information from a trustworthy source. … Scott reasonably relied on a trustworthy source. Thus, when Scallion was initially handcuffed, defendant had probable cause to arrest Scallion. In other words, it was reasonable for Scott and his fellow Red River Parish Deputies to conclude that Scallion had committed or was committing an offense.” Scallion v. Red River Parish, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9796 (W.D. La. February 12, 2007).*
Patdown during traffic stop was consented to by defendant, and a marijuana pipe was found. One officer testified to consent at the suppression hearing, and the other officer testified he could not hear the answer [how refreshing: an officer who did not automatically confirm the other]. The finding of consent was supported by the record. State v. Chidester, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 61 (January 31, 2007).*
Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant who was in the only car around that matched the description of the car given by a forgery victim who called 911. The car had not yet left the parking lot of the business. State v. Funderburg, 2007 NMCA 21, 151 P.3d 911 (December 11, 2006), certiorari granted, 2007 N.M. LEXIS 18 (January 30, 2007).*
