Reasonableness standard applies to a search by a school resource officer investigating an alleged rape at school

When one student alleged that another had raped her at a public school, the school resource officer was able to investigate, and his questioning and requesting that a student remove his shirt to look for scratches or other evidence of the alleged assault was sufficiently based on reasonable suspicion. The reasonableness standard for school resource officers has been applied by numerous other courts, and the Seventh Circuit would apply it here. Wilson v. Cahokia Sch. Dist. # 187, 470 F. Supp. 2d 897 (S.D. Ill. 2007).

Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue, the weight of authority holds, and the Court agrees, that a search of a student on school grounds by a school resource officer at the request of school officials should be deemed a search by a school employee for Fourth Amendment purposes and thus is subject to the reasonableness standard, not the probable cause standard. See, e.g., In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 699-700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (a police officer on assignment to a school as a resource officer was a “school official” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and thus his search of a student was analyzed under the T.L.O. reasonableness standard); State v. N.G.B., 806 So. 2d 567, 568-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (reasonableness, not probable cause, was the appropriate standard by which to assess the legality of a search of a student by a school resource officer, where the investigation was initiated by the school’s vice principal who enlisted the officer’s assistance); State v. Whorley, 720 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (a search of a student by a school resource officer must be justified at its inception, and the search must be reasonably related in scope to the reason for the search); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996) (the reasonableness standard, not the probable cause standard, applied to determine whether a police liaison officer, who was a staff member at an alternative school for students with behavioral disorders, violated a student’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching a flashlight possessed by the student, who was suspected of involvement with drugs); In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 436-37 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the reasonableness standard where a school resource officer conducted a search of a student at the request of a school official); In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 687 (Wis. 1997) (citing Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 191-92 (8th Cir. 1987)) (the reasonableness standard, not the probable cause standard, applied to a search conducted by a school liaison officer, at the request of and in conjunction with school officials, of a student reasonably suspected of carrying a dangerous weapon on school grounds; the officer became involved in the investigation only after school officials requested his assistance, and, throughout the course of the investigation, he acted in conjunction with school officials on school grounds).

Turning then to the search at issue in this case, the Court discerns no genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the search. The search obviously was justified at its inception, as Adams had reported to Prince that she had been sexually assaulted by another student, an incident which clearly demanded prompt investigation by school officials. Further, the record demonstrates that the search was reasonably related in scope to the reason for the search, in light of the factors outlined in Vernonia.

Defendants were driving a rented SUV from Seattle east, and they ran it off the road and onto its side in a blizzard in North Dakota. An officer came upon the vehicle with no one around, and checked and found no accident having been reported with it. He found it open and he sought to ascertain whose vehicle it was from looking through the glove box and then inventorying the contents. The court found the officer’s determination that the vehicle was a “hazard” was reasonable because people might have stopped to render aid since it was 40 feet from the highway and visible. His inventory of the vehicle was sufficiently standardized to pass constitutional muster. United States v. Thi Le, 474 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. January 22, 2007)*

An anonymous tip that was uncorroborated failed to justify granting summary judgment for a police officer in a false arrest case. Diaz v. Jenne, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4049 (S.D. Fla. January 19, 2007).*

Officer’s talking with plaintiff to gather information from him prior to the plaintiff’s arrest was not a seizure because plaintiff was not restrained at that point. At some point, however, the situation escalated into a handcuffing, and the justification for it is unclear, so the officer’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to that part of it. Morales v. Taveras, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4081 (E.D. Pa. January 18, 2007).*