Invoking right to counsel and silence without being asked for consent did not imply a refusal of consent, so officer could ask cotenant for consent under Randolph

Defendant and his roommate were suspects in an attempted arson based on a store security videotape of them buying gas in a gas can nearby and shortly before the attempted arson. Officers went to the house and talked to the roommate who admitted presence but inferentially implicated the defendant. The officer asked to talk to the defendant who invoked Miranda. Based on the statement of the other, the officer had probable cause to arrest, so defendant was handcuffed. The officer then secured consent from the roommate, and shoes were found matching shoe prints at the scene. Invoking Miranda did not invoke Randolph as well because nothing in the invocation of rights included a refusal to consent to a search. Indeed, he was never even asked for consent. People v. Lapworth, 273 Mich. App. 424, 730 N.W.2d 258 (2006).

An NYPD officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker in the precinct house from a search by Internal Affairs. It was alleged, and defendant detective admitted, that he purloined nude photos from two female crime victims. The search of the locker occurred after the detective said that he had destroyed the photos. People v. Vecchio, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3465, 234 N.Y.L.J. 59 (Richmond Co. September 23, 2005).

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants’ car for being backed into a loading dock at a police building where undercover cars were kept. He first encountered the defendants and made them get in the car and leave. After they left he stopped them, and he made them leave so he could have time for back up to arrive. On the totality, the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop, and great cause to detain them after his observations during the stop. Commonwealth v. Plante, 2006 PA Super 376, 914 A.2d 916 (December 28, 2006).*

Officer noticed furtive movements during a traffic stop, and told the defendant to keep his hands visible. The defendant said that he would not consent to a search, but he would consent to a patdown. The patdown revealed heroin capsules by plain feel, and the officer was entitled under Dickerson to seize them. Cost v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 215, 638 S.E.2d 714 (December 28, 2006).*

Officer had cause for arrest and impoundment and search of vehicle even though the statute under which the arrest occurred was later invalidated, extending Potter to a different statute because the rationale is the same. State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 150 P.3d 59 (December 28, 2006)*:

We recently determined that a police officer who arrested a person for violating RCW 46.20.342(1)(c) prior to Moore had probable cause to believe that the individual had committed a crime. State v. Potter, 156 Wn.2d 835, 843-44, 132 P.3d 1089 (2006). We concluded that “probable cause is determined at the time of arrest” and “reliable information from the DOL indicated [the defendants] were committing the crime.” Id. at 844.

Although Potter involved a different statute, the same principle applies here. Officer Black arrested Gonzales after observing him driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield because, when he verified Gonzales’ name on DOL records, he found that Gonzales had a suspended driver’s license. Officer Black was entitled to rely on DOL records in accordance with Potter. As in Potter, this court struck down the statute under which Gonzales’ license was suspended subsequent to Gonzales’ arrest. See id. at 841. Nevertheless, the DOL information available to Officer Black at the time was sufficient to warrant the belief that Gonzales had committed the offense of driving with a suspended license. Officer Black’s reliance on the DOL information was reasonably prudent at the time of the arrest, and he had probable cause to believe that Gonzales had committed a misdemeanor in his presence.