CA1: 911 call about man with gun permitted stop of two men leaving address as officers arrived

Five officers responded to a 911 call about a gun potentially being used in a confrontation that the caller said was escalating into a fight. On arrival at the house, two men were walking away from it dressed in baggy clothes that could have concealed a weapon. “Although their actions could have been entirely innocent, the circumstances reasonably supported a more sinister explanation.” United States v. Brake, 666 F.3d 800 (1st Cir. 2011):

Here, the facts display reasonable suspicion with respect to both the stop and the pat-down. With respect to the stop, the 911 caller had reported the presence of a man with a handgun at the residence making threats and that a fight seemed imminent. See Romain, 393 F.3d at 73-74 (contrasting reliability of information provided by a 911 caller who is at the site of the reported criminal activity with the holding in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), in which uncorroborated information from an anonymous tip emanating from an “unknown caller” phoning from an “unknown location” was deemed insufficient to warrant a Terry stop). A potentially fatal situation may have been rapidly cresting; indeed, five police officers responded, arriving without delay. The police immediately noticed two men who, given their temporal and spatial connection to the scene, may very well have just left the residence. Cf. United States v. Golab, 325 F.3d 63, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that Terry stop was improperly based only on an “impermissible hunch” in part because the seized car was located in a remote parking lot and thus lacked a geographical connection to the site of the suspected criminal activity). The baggy clothing that the men wore easily could have concealed a handgun. Finally, the cohorts’ conduct at the parked van gave rise to a fair suspicion that they may have either deposited a gun or retrieved additional weaponry. Although their actions could have been entirely innocent, the circumstances reasonably supported a more sinister explanation. See United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that “[u]nder Terry, the test is whether the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, not whether the defendant’s actions are subject to no reasonable innocent explanation.”).

These circumstances called for quick decision-making by the police. See generally United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Viewing the whole fabric through the lens of a reasonable and cautious police officer, we conclude that specific and articulable facts justified the Terry stop to investigate Brake’s possible involvement in the reported disturbance.