State officers conducted an ion scan of defendant’s apartment doorknob and lock which was legal under state law. This violated no reasonable expectation of privacy because the doorknob in an apartment hallway is not part of the curtilage. United States v. Jones, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75284 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2024):
Weighing these factors, the Court finds that Jones’s apartment’s exterior doorknob and lock are not part of his home’s curtilage. The Eighth Circuit instructs that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971, 975-76 (8th Cir. 2011). Jones’s apartment door is in a common space and accessible to the public. Nobody would claim that Girl Scouts or trick-or-treaters knocking on his door would violate the federal Constitution. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). The Court finds conducting an ion swab scan constitutes similar contact with the exterior door. Further, Jones, as a renter, lacks the right to exclude individuals from interfering with the exterior of his door. For example, Jones does not have the right to forbid the owner of the apartment building from replacing or repainting the doorknob or lock. Cf. United States v. Martinez, No. 22-86, 2022 WL 18011789, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2022). Thus, the doorknob and lock are not within the apartment’s curtilage. A critical factor is the fact that the apartment building is unlocked and thus accessible to the public. In such instances, the doorknob and lock do not carry with them a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Jones claims that the officers unconstitutionally trespassed his home when they physically touched his apartment doorknob and lock, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 n.3 (2012), using sense-enhancing technology to gather “any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,'” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). However, the ion swabbing at issue in this case is distinguishable from installing a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle to monitor the vehicle’s movements and using thermal imaging technology to detect infrared radiation within constitutionally protected spaces. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. While ion swab scans detect unseen traces of controlled substances on a front door, they do not affirmatively reveal anything beyond the door, unlike the thermal imaging technology at issue in Kyllo. And while the officers did physically touch the doorknob and lock of Jones’ apartment door to collect the sample for the ion swab scan, the Court finds there is no reasonable expectation of privacy of an apartment doorknob and lock that warrants constitutional protection.
Analogous caselaw involving the use of drug detection dogs supports this conclusion by distinguishing the door of an apartment in a common hallway to the door of a single-family home. Using a drug detection dog to sniff the door frame of an apartment located in a common hallway does not constitute a search. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010). In contrast, using a drug detection dog to sniff a door on the porch of a single-family home does. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11-12. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit has “neither expressly overruled Scott nor explained how Jardines applies to apartment doors in a common hallway.” United States v. Perez, 46 F.4th 691, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hines, 62 F.4th 1087, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 2023). Though Judge Kelly in her concurring opinion in Perez indicated that the area around an apartment door that opens into a common hallway may be curtilage, without explicit guidance from the Eighth Circuit that an apartment door in a common hallway is curtilage, the Court will follow precedent. 46 F.4th at 705-07 (Kelly, J., concurring). In the Court’s view, there are different expectations of privacy for these spaces. The front door of an apartment in a common hallway is physically located within a common space, whereas the front porch is a part of the home itself “to which the activity of home life extends.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7.
In sum, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in generally accessible spaces like the shared hallway outside Jones’s apartment door, which includes the apartment doorknob and locking mechanism. The doorknob and lock are not part of the home’s curtilage. As a result, the ion swab scan of Jones’s apartment doorknob and locking mechanism was not a search.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)