Two more on “clearly established”

“The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts ‘not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’ Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (citation omitted). ‘The dispositive question is “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” … Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011)).” United States Court of Appeals Fifth Cir. Filed Donald Woods v. Harris County, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6684 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).*

“‘[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an offic[ial] to determine how the relevant legal doctrine … will apply to the factual situation the offic[ial] confronts.’ Id. (citation omitted). Finally, whether a government official may be held liable ‘generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, … assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time it was taken.’ Jenkins, 838 F.3d at 946-47 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987)).” Davitt v. Spindler-Krage, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6697 (8th Cir. Mar. 21, 2024).*