CA9: Arizona v. Hicks explained

An officer searching a car with probable cause saw a bill partially hidden in the weatherstripping. It did not violate Arizona v. Hicks for the officer to pull out the bill, look at it, and discover that it was counterfeit. This case has an interesting discussion of the scope of Hicks. United States v. Ewing, 638 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2011):

Despite its unusual factual circumstances, Hicks does not state a particularly novel principle of law. The proposition that the justification for a search defines its permissible scope is well established. For example, if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to search a vehicle, that probable cause extends to all contents in the vehicle that could be connected to the suspected criminal activity. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999) (“When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers … to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.”); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982) (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”).

Hicks holds that a law enforcement officer may examine an item unrelated to the initial object of a search if the item is in plain view and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the item is connected to criminal activity. 480 U.S. at 326. The case does not set forth a rule that police officers must justify, on a molecular level, the manner in which they examine every object within the scope of a valid search. Therefore, the central question facing us is not whether unfolding the bills produced a new invasion of Mr. Ewing’s privacy interest but, instead, whether the justification for the search of the car extended to the bills.

The Fourth Amendment requires, as a general matter, that police procure a warrant before searching or seizing property. Arizona v. Gant, __ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,” however, “police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime,” Brooks, 610 F.3d at 1193, and “the vehicle is readily mobile,” Davis, 530 F.3d at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer has probable cause “when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the district court that the circumstances presented a fair probability that the money was involved in drug trafficking and that a search of Vera’s car would have revealed evidence of a crime. …

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