Defendant, when confronted by police, put a baggie of cocaine in his mouth in an attempt to swallow it, and he began to choke on it. The officer acted reasonably in applying pressure to the back of his neck to get it out, considering that defendant could have OD’ed on the cocaine. Grier v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. October 31, 2006):
The circumstances were much different in the instant case. Here, Officer Moncrief applied pressure to Grier’s neck for approximately fifteen seconds, a much shorter amount of time than in Conwell. Furthermore, the officers did not mace Grier. Officer Moncrief testified that he applied pressure to Grier’s neck to prevent him from swallowing the baggie, but there was no evidence that Grier’s airway was blocked or that he was being choked by Officer Moncrief. In fact, Grier was already choking and gagging on the baggie when Officer Moncrief began to apply pressure. Therefore, we conclude that there was an insignificant threat–and perhaps even a benefit, when one considers the potential risk of ingesting cocaine–to Grier’s health and safety and that the intrusion upon his dignitary interests and bodily integrity was minimal. Also, Officer Moncrief acted in the community’s interest to preserve evidence that is necessary to determine Grier’s guilt or innocence. In sum, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Officer Moncrief’s search of Grier’s person was reasonable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
The search warrant did not give a postal address of the place to be searched, but, at the scene, there were four trailers out of order by number and one without a number. The officers at the scene were still able to determine the correct place because one of the officers had been there before to serve papers. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 306 Ill. Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15 (October 19, 2006):
In this case, the warrant did not list the specific postal address of the premises to be searched. Therefore, the confusion that occurred regarding the addresses of the various trailers subsequent to the execution of the warrant is inapposite. Instead, the warrant described the location to be searched with respect to three factors: (1) the identity of an individual, (2) the approximate mileage between an intersection and the property on which the trailer to be searched was located, and (3) the position of that trailer in relation to other trailers.
The description was accurate with regard to the first factor, as it is undisputed that McCarty stayed regularly at the trailer that was searched, kept personal belongings there, and came and went from it as he pleased. Furthermore, McCarty’s son lived there. Thus, while McCarty did not hold title to the trailer, he did exhibit numerous indicia of permanent occupancy.
The description’s reference to the second factor was similarly accurate. As the warrant noted, the three-quarters of a mile distance measurement was an approximation. This approximation was sufficiently specific to direct the officers executing the search warrant to the property on which the particular trailer to be searched was located, as it is undisputed that driving three-quarters of a mile south from the Kinlou Road-O’Leary Road intersection would, at a minimum, place an individual at the beginning of the private drive and, at a maximum, place him at the doorstep of the trailer that was searched.
Finally, the description’s reference to the third factor, the position of the trailer searched in relation to the other trailers, was also accurate. There unquestionably were four trailers located alongside the private drive. However, only three of those trailers were inhabited, and the appearance of the trailer that was not stood in marked distinction to the appearances of those that were. The uninhabited trailer still had wheels and a hitch, and it lacked underpinning. It was also positioned on a slight incline adjacent to a farm building. Furthermore, the testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that all of the other trailers were visible prior to the uninhabited trailer upon approaching the property from the Kinlou Road-O’Leary Road intersection.
In cases such as this one, where the particularity of a warrant is called into question only upon its execution, and where the extent of the warrant description’s inaccuracy is minimal, courts generally are “receptive to a showing that the executing officer had some other information ***, via the warrant affidavit or otherwise, which made it apparent which place was intended.” 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5(a), at 570 (4th ed. 2004). We believe this to be a sensible approach and therefore make note in this case of the fact that Deputy Rose, the officer in charge of executing the warrant, had served papers at the trailer that was searched on a previous occasion and was therefore familiar with its location. See also People v. Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d 152, 158, 728 N.E.2d 1260, 245 Ill. Dec. 903 (2000) (“Inaccuracies will not necessarily invalidate a warrant if the officer applying for the warrant also executed the warrant”). This factor, coupled with those discussed above, persuades us to conclude that the warrant’s description of the premises to be searched was sufficiently particular.
Defendant was found to be illegally detained when he fled. If he were searched when first detained, it would have been unlawful. He fled, however, and the officer tackled him. When he pulled the defendant up, there was meth under him, and it was not suppressed under Hodari D. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 146 P.3d 697 (2006).*
