Detention under Summers is not an exception to Miranda

The District of Massachusetts holds that the police authority to detain persons during execution of a search warrant does not create a Miranda exception. Being held at gunpoint, defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Mittel-Carey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76431 (D. Mass. October 20, 2006):

Since the justification for the detention in Summers is to (1) prevent the suspect from fleeing the scene; (2) ensure the safety of the officers and the integrity of potential evidence; and (3) help facilitate an efficient and orderly search, the detention of occupants of a search ought be limited to effectuating these objectives. As the Ganwich court so pellucidly explained, the interrogation in issue “did not deter the plaintiff’s flight, did not reduce the risk of harm to officers, and did not assist the officers in the orderly completion of the search.” Id. Therefore, an interrogation in this situation would not be “carefully tailored to the detention’s underlying justification” and must be considered “more intrusive than necessary.” Id.

The argument could be made that Lawson’s inquiry as to where additional items of child pornography might be found was in furtherance of the search, consistent with the stated rationales in Summers. Lawson’s inquiry elicited Mittel-Carey’s response, “[I]t’s all on the computer.” This interaction concerned the details of the search and potentially narrowed its scope, better preserving the privacy of the occupants of the house, and generally facilitating the search for all concerned. Summers, however, indicated only that detained occupants might help the police “open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of the task at hand.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 703. Lawson’s inquiry did not seek Mittel-Carey’s assistance in opening locked compartments. Rather, Lawson asked Mittel-Carey to inculpate himself. In this light, to authorize Lawson’s inquiry would be to read Summers as carving out, sub silentio, a significant exception to Miranda. Such an argument must be rejected in light of the observation in Summers that such detentions are “not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention.” Id. at 701. See also, e.g., Ganwich, 319 F.3d at 1122 (applying Miranda analysis in context of Summers detention); United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Freeman, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (same); United States v. Burns, 811 F. Supp. 408, 412-13 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (same).

Use of drug dog on a correctional officer’s car in the prison parking lot as a generalized shakedown of employees was not unreasonable. Kitchens v. King, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76434 (M.D. Ga. October 17, 2006).