D.S.D.: No reasonable suspicion, but the dog alert came after a speeding stop, so no suppression

The officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants, and the court discounts all of the [lame] justifications or indicators given by the officer as being meaningless, individually and collectively. However, the stop was justified by speeding, and the court is “regrettably” reluctant to grant suppression of the dog sniff that occurred reasonably promptly. United States v. Sepulveda-Sandoval, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (D. S.D. 2010)*:

Regrettably, this is a case where the defendants may not avail themselves of the remedy of suppression as a result of Trooper Oxner’s Fourth Amendment violation. The court leaves for another day and a higher court Chief Justice Marshal’s observation that every right has a remedy or it is no right at all. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163-64 (1803).

Putting a GPS on defendant’s vehicle during a drug investigation was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jesus-Nunez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76107 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010).*

Defendant’s IAC claim is not proper in a direct appeal; he has to do it through a § 2255. United States v. King, 388 Fed. Appx. 194 (3d Cir. 2010).*

The drug dog sniff of defendant’s car was justified during his stop with reasonable suspicion, and that developed from a wiretap on somebody else’s telephone, and defendant refused consent [not a factor in RS; they tried that before the dog was called in]. United States v. Scott, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75687 (D. Kan. July 27, 2010).*

There was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant in this case, and, even if there wasn’t, the good faith exception would make the evidence admissible. United States v. Wright, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129240 (S.D. Ga. May 5, 2009).*

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