IL: Exclusionary rule does not apply to a forcible entry and detainer action

The exclusionary rule did not apply to a forcible entry and detainer action to remove defendant from a publicly owned apartment building for drug usage on the premises. United States Residential Mgmt. & Dev. v. Head, 397 Ill. App. 3d 156, 922 N.E.2d 1, 337 Ill. Dec. 143 (2009):

The present case is distinguishable from One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. Here, the focus of the Act is not to punish defendant, but rather to set forth a mechanism for the peaceful adjudication of possession rights in the circuit court. In addition, while defendant may be subjected to a harsh consequence – losing his residence–-this consequence does not transform this civil proceeding into a quasi-criminal proceeding. When the Supreme Court denied extending the exclusionary rule in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984), and in Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998), the possible sanctions were deportation and incarceration, respectively. These sanctions, while harsh, did not transform the civil proceedings into quasi-criminal proceedings. These sanctions are also equally, if not more, harsh than losing one’s residence.

. . .

Balancing the factors in the present case, we conclude that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to encompass the present situation. The cost to CHA and the truth-finding process outweigh the benefit which would result from the application of the exclusionary rule in forcible entry and detainer actions. By applying the exclusionary rule in the present case, CHA would be unable to consider valuable and relevant evidence of potential criminal activity that would impede the truth-finding function of the circuit court. To extend the rule and suppress evidence of criminal activity would hinder CHA’s ability to enforce lease agreements designed to promote safety and deter illegal conduct in public housing communities. This rationale is consistent with the concerns of the Illinois General Assembly in implementing the Act, which was to protect persons at public housing premises from “imminent danger and peril to [their] lives, safety, health and mental and physical well being.” Pub. Act 87–0933, eff. August 27, 1992 (adding 735 ILCS 5/9–118). The circuit court failed to incorporate this half of the analysis under the exclusionary rule balancing test.

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