CA6: Knock-and-talk on curtilage was permitted

Officers came to plaintiff’s home for a knock-and-talk, and he went out the back with a gun in hand. One officer pursued him, and he ended up racking and pointing the gun and getting shot. The officers get qualified immunity for the knock-and-talk, but not the search or for the shooting. Facts remain for trial. Naselroad v. Mabry, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4449 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019)* (prior opinion Naselroad v. Mabry, 686 Fed. Appx. 312 (6th Cir. 2017) (remanded for a hearing on Heck defense)). As to the Heck claim:

Craycraft argues that Heck bars Naselroad’s § 1983 claims because Naselroad’s state convictions relied exclusively on evidence ultimately obtained as a result of what Naselroad maintains was an unconstitutional entry onto the Naselroad property. If Naselroad succeeds in his claim, and no legal doctrine would nonetheless save the evidence from exclusion, then the evidence undergirding his state convictions should have been suppressed. Consequently, Naselroad’s success here would necessarily imply that his state convictions were based on improper evidence. See Harper v. Jackson, 293 F. App’x 389, 392 (6th Cir. 2008). The district court rejected this argument on the grounds that a legal doctrine exists which would have kept the evidence from being suppressed—the good-faith exception to suppression established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-23 (1984). The Leon good-faith exception applies to evidence obtained by an officer who conducted a search in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant (later found to be defective) that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Id.

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