N.D.Tex.: Alleged innocent driver of a stolen car still failed to show standing

Rounding up students and herding them to the football field while there was a dog sniff of all student belongings required to be kept inside. This was not a search nor an unreasonable seizure. Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 2009 DNH 32, 616 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. H.N. March 25, 2009). [This case was posted as “Not for Publication” when released but it was published.] Lexis overview:

Defendants became concerned that there was a serious drug problem at the high school and requested a search using police dogs. Students were told to leave their belongings and escorted to the football field, where they were kept for 90 minutes. The police dogs sniffed the students’ belongings in the school. The court determined that the use of drug dogs to sniff the students’ belongings did not qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment because the canine sniffs did not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view. Holding the students on the football field did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, because (1) students were evacuated from the building and corralled outside 10 times a year for required drills, (2) this exercise was not conducted in a stigmatizing manner and no one student, or group of students, was alone the target of a dog’s nose, and (3) regarding leaving their personal belongings inside the building, students were often restricted in what items they could bring to school and where they could leave those items.

The court concludes that the defendant manifested abandonment of a backpack found in a truck. When the vehicle was stopped, the defendant was asked about the backpack, and he disclaimed any ownership in it. United States v. Hinsey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61192 (D. Haw. July 17, 2009).*

Alleged innocent driver of a stolen car still did not have standing. It was his burden and he failed. United States v. Cates, 641 F. Supp. 2d 613 (N.D. Tex. 2009):

Cates argues that “the driver of a stolen vehicle has a sufficient privacy and possessory interest in that vehicle for Fourth Amendment purposes if he is oblivious to the fact that it is stolen,” and that “‘[at the evidentiary hearing] the [G]overnment only presented evidence that the vehicle was in fact stolen and that Cates candidly acknowledged that the vehicle did not belong to him.” Cates argues that because “the [G]overnment presented no evidence establishing that Cates stole the searched vehicle, that he knew the vehicle was stolen or, even if he knew it was stolen, [or] that he knew it was stolen at the time he acquired it,” the Court should presumptively find that he was an innocent possessor of the vehicle and therefore had a legitimate expectation of privacy in it.

This argument lacks merit because Cates improperly reallocates the burden of proof, by seeking to require the Government to disprove his reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car. That reverses the appropriate burden. If Cates relies on a lack of knowledge of the stolen character of the vehicle to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, he bears the burden of proof of such facts. Cates’ proffered example, where an individual acquires a stolen vehicle innocently from an “unscrupulous” car dealer, would present a legitimate question regarding an expectation of privacy in an unwittingly stolen vehicle. But it would require proof of such a purchase by the Defendant, and no such proof was offered in this case.

Rather than arguing that he did not know the car was stolen, or that he believed he was in rightful possession of the car, Cates merely argues that the Government failed to prove otherwise. Cates has failed to meet his burden of proving that he innocently possessed the stolen vehicle, so the Court need not consider under what circumstances an individual who innocently possesses a stolen vehicle may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.