Reopening a suppression hearing on the court’s own motion is within the court’s discretion, and defendant did not show prejudice from it. United States v. Stennis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53479 (E.D. Tenn. June 23, 2009).*
The court finds credible the officer’s statement that he smelled burnt marijuana when he stopped the defendant, and the government was not required to put physical evidence in at the hearing to support that. United States v. McCaster, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53632 (N.D. Ohio June 24, 2009).*
Defendant was following too close and RS developed. “Here, Applegate’s reasonable suspicion of contraband in the Defendant’s vehicle was based upon: (1) the Defendant’s nervousness, (2) the overwhelming scent of air freshener in the car, (3) the fact the Defendant was an unauthorized driver of the rental car; (4) Defendant’s contradictory statements about rental and whether his girlfriend rented the vehicle; (5) the quick sequence trip, and (6) the impossibility of renting the car two days ago.” United States v. Fields, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53643 (M.D. Tenn. June 24, 2009).*
A vehicle seized with PC can be relocated for a search. Here, it was taken to FBI headquarters for the search. United States v. Mujahid, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53561 (D. Alaska May 12, 2009), R&R 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53563 (D. Alaska May 4, 2009).*
Officer had RS when a known prostitute waved down a passing vehicle and she got in it. United States v. Cross, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53559 (D. Alaska May 1, 2009).*
Defendant in mail fraud case failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the computers of the company he was allegedly affiliated with where he sought to distance himself from the offices. United States v. Tranquillo, 606 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D. N.Y. 2009)*:
Even had he put the foregoing facts in admissible form, however, they nonetheless would be insufficient to establish that Mr. Tranquillo’s personal rights were violated by the search of the two A & D Carting computers. Although Mr. Tranquillo alleges that he was “an occasional occupant” of the A & D Carting offices and had key access to the business premises, see Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 2, these facts are relevant only if the two seized computers were kept in A & D Carting’s offices and if Mr. Tranquillo regularly occupied or worked in the particular room in which the computers were kept. The record evidence, however, contains no indication whatsoever as to where the seized computers were kept. See Chuang, 897 F.2d at 649 (asking whether the defendant demonstrated “a sufficient nexus between the area searched and his own work space”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). More important, the record evidence does not reveal whether Mr. Tranquillo regularly occupied or worked in the particular room in which the computers were kept. See Dinero Express, Inc., 2000 WL 254012, at *5-6 (finding that the defendant lacked standing where, among other things, he only “occasionally” visited the premises searched); Hamdan, 891 F. Supp. at 94-95 (“[T]he less private a work area–and the less control a defendant has over that work area–the less likely standing is to be found.”).
Notably, Mr. Tranquillo, in his request for a Franks hearing, claims that he “was never an owner, manager, or supervisor of A&D Carting,” that he “merely” was “a driver for A&D Carting,” and that he “had no role in the billing of Mt. Vernon or any other account.” Def.’s Mem. at 9. Given such factual allegations, it is indeed implausible that Mr. Tranquillo had access to, or a privacy or proprietary interest in, A & D Carting’s computers. 4 See Chuang, 897 F.2d at 649 (holding that a defendant “has a reasonable expectation of privacy to challenge the search of business premises … [if] he has made a sufficient showing of a possessory or proprietary interest in the area searched”).
