CA8: AR motor carrier act provides warrant substitute

Arkansas Motor Carrier Act provides permissible warrant substitute. United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2009):

Our sister circuits that have considered the issue have all held warrantless inspections of commercial trucks advance a substantial governmental interest and are necessary, see United States v. Delgado, 545 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008), United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 135-36 (1st Cir. 2004), United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2001), United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001), United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468-69 (6th Cir. 1991), and we have implicitly so held, see United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788, 793-94 (8th Cir. 2004), United States v. Knight, 306 F.3d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 2002). We are thus persuaded that warrantless inspections of commercial trucks advance a substantial governmental interest and are necessary.

We next find the Arkansas Motor Carrier Act provides a permissible warrant substitute. Its reach is limited to certain commercial vehicles. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-13-203, -204, and -206; see also Dominguez v. State, 290 Ark. 428, 720 S.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Ark. 1986). It provides notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility of a roadside inspection by a designated enforcement officer. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 23-13-217. And it limits the scope of the enforcement officers’ inspections to an examination solely for regulatory compliance. Id. at (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B) (enforcement officer may “[i]nspect the contents of the vehicle for the purpose of comparing the contents with bills of lading, waybills, invoices, or other evidence of ownership or of transportation for compensation”). Finally, although the Arkansas Motor Carrier Act does not designate specific times when the enforcement officers may conduct inspections, as the Sixth Circuit held, “[s]uch a limitation would, of course, render the entire inspection scheme unworkable and meaningless. Trucks operate twenty-four hours a day and the officers must, necessarily, have the authority to conduct these administrative inspections at any time.” Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 470; see also Delgado, 545 F.3d at 1203 n.6 (quoting the same).

While it is possible to have standing in business premises as a worker, defendant’s connection to the computers at work gives him no standing. United States v. Tranquillo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51370 (S.D. N.Y. March 4, 2009):

Even had he put the foregoing facts in admissible form [as a factual proffer], however, they nonetheless would be insufficient to establish that Mr. Tranquillo’s personal rights were violated by the search of the two A & D Carting computers. Although Mr. Tranquillo alleges that he was “an occasional occupant” of the A & D Carting offices and had key access to the business premises, see Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 2, these facts are relevant only if the two seized computers were kept in A & D Carting’s offices and if Mr. Tranquillo regularly occupied or worked in the particular room in which the computers were kept. The record evidence, however, contains no indication whatsoever as to where the seized computers were kept. See Chuang, 897 F.2d at 649 (asking whether the defendant demonstrated a “a sufficient nexus between the area searched and his own work space”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). More important, the record evidence does not reveal whether Mr. Tranquillo regularly occupied or worked in the particular room in which the computers were kept. See Dinero Express, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2439, 2000 WL 254012, at *5-6 (finding that the defendant lacked standing where, among other things, he only “occasionally” visited the premises searched); Hamdan, 891 F. Supp. at 94-95 (“[T]he less private a work area–and the less control a defendant has over that work area–the less likely standing is to be found.”).