D.Iowa: Furtive movement five minutes before the patdown still justified it

While it is true that the officers observed a furtive movement five minutes before they did anything about it, as confirmed by the video of the stop, that did not moot the furtive movement in the reasonable suspicion calculus. The court also rejects the notion that flight is an expected response to a frisk. United States v. Hardy, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51106 (N.D. Iowa June 17, 2009):

Although the squad car video indicates the officers seemed unconcerned in their dealings with the van, the court finds that a reasonably prudent person under these circumstances would be warranted in believing his safety or that of others was in danger. After all, the CRPD narcotics unit had informed the officers that one of the occupants was involved in a drug transaction. When an individual is suspected of drug involvement, it is reasonable for a police officer to believe that the individual may be armed and dangerous. United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions, it is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction.”).

Defendant had standing to challenge the search of a bedroom in which he stayed, particularly since the government intended to prove that he stayed there to connect him to what was found there. The SW authorized the search of the “entire residence and all curtilage known as 2302 N. Market Street” [emphasis in original], and, when compared to the statement of probable cause in the affidavit for the warrant, there was no specific reason to limit the search to places within the house because the PC extended to the entire residence. United States v. Watson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51156 (D. Del. June 18, 2009).*

Since USMJs have the “awesome power” to issue search warrants, they also have the lesser power to order return of the seized property under Rule 41(g). Here, the claimant fails because he has not shown that the government’s retaining the property was unreasonable. Even a procedural failure would not be enough because it likely would not result in suppression under Hudson. In re 3765 Kettle Court E., Delafield, Wisconsin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51239 (E.D. Wisc. May 29, 2009).