IL: Stop based on air freshener on mirror shown to be mistake of law

Stop was based on an air freshener hanging from the mirror supposedly obstructing driver’s view. The air freshener was smaller than the officer testified, and there was no testimony that it actually obstructed the driver’s view. Therefore, the stop was based on a mistake of law, and the motion to suppress was properly granted. People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539, 329 Ill. Dec. 314, 906 N.E.2d 159 (2009).*

Claimant’s claim he was detained and did not consent in an airport is rejected. “Further, the facts of this case are markedly different from those presented in Stephens, where the bus passengers had few options to end the encounter with the officers. Particularly, McVey’s argument that leaving the airport and abandoning his checked-baggage was his only option to terminate the encounter with the Agents ignores the possibility that he could have withheld consent to speak with the officers, moved to another location outside, or returned inside to the baggage carousels.” United States v. Approximately $52,000 in United States Currency, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35429 (N.D. Cal. April 10, 2009).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant’s DL was suspended for life, so that justified the stop. Bannister v. State, 904 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. 2009).*

Compound question to defendant (“I just asked him if there was anything illegal in the vehicle and if I could search it”) did not make it impossible to not consent. All he had to say was “no.” United States v. Barnum, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 8994 (8th Cir. April 28, 2009)*:

Second, even if we were to accept Barnum’s characterization of Officer Hatler’s request to search Barnum’s rental vehicle, we still would not find that the question guaranteed Barnum’s consent. Barnum’s “loaded” question theory is premised on a single piece of Officer Hatler’s testimony concerning his request to search Barnum’s rental vehicle: “I just asked him if there was anything illegal in the vehicle and if I could search it.” According to Barnum, the question’s compound phrasing placed him between Scylla and Charybdis, requiring him either to give consent or appear to be concealing contraband. However, Barnum’s premise does not support the conclusion that the question’s compound phrasing compelled Barnum to respond “yes. ” A simple answer of “no ” to Officer Hatler’s allegedly “loaded” question would have denied consent to the search and presumably terminated the encounter. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”).

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