Cal.4: State’s failure to put on proof relating to GFE precluded reliance on it on appeal

The state failed to prove that defendant’s search was validly based on the parole search exception, and then failed to put on any proof that the good faith exception would apply [aside from the fact the good faith exception is almost universally based on a search warrant without PC]. People v. Pearl, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 85 (4th Dist. 2009):

The prosecution here neither asserted the good faith exception nor met its burden of proving its applicability. In the trial court, the prosecutor did not invoke or argue any exception to the exclusionary rule. On the day of the suppression hearing, the prosecutor filed written opposition to Pearl’s motion to suppress, arguing (1) Pearl was on parole at the time of the search, (2) the parole search validly extended to common areas of the house in which Pearl rented a room, and (3) Spira consented to the searches of her home. After the close of evidence at the suppression hearing, the trial court asked the prosecutor directly, “[w]e’re not talking about good faith reliance on [a] search warrant, are we?” The prosecutor replied, “I would ask to do some research into that. That pops in[to] my mind, good faith exception but we don’t have to go that far.” (Italics added.)

The prosecution did not present evidence directed to the good faith exception. Crager never testified to the substance of any conversations with the “parole department.” Pearl’s parole agent did not testify. The prosecution offered Pearl’s CDC record to prove he was in fact on parole on December 13, 2004, not to prove Crager or anyone else reasonably relied on that record in determining Pearl was subject to a parole search.

Defendant validly confessed to a crime, and then consented as a part of the confession. The suppression order was reversed. State v. Rooks, 674 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. App. 2009).*

SW for “documents showing ownership, control and access [that] constitutes evidence of a crime and the identity of the person(s) participating in a crime” permitted seizure of rap lyrics written in a notebook. State v. Bryant, 674 S.E.2d 753 (N.C. App. 2009).*

Officer’s entry into defendant’s open garage to inspect a vehicle for a hit and run was reasonable and based on exigent circumstances. He knocked but the defendant did not answer before he walked in. Commenwealth v. Fickes, 2009 PA Super 64, 2009 Pa. Super. LEXIS 78 (April 8, 2009).

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