OH7: Defendant was handcuffed on an old warrant, released when it was found to be recalled, and then he validly consented

“[S]trip searches carried out in non-secluded areas of prisons and in the presence of prison employees of the opposite sex are not unconstitutional.” Tuft v. Chaney, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12860 (S.D. Tex. February 17, 2009).*

Probable cause was shown for seizure of DNA evidence in a bank robbery case. United States v. Cornelius, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12849 (D. Kan. February 19, 2009).*

Defendant was detained based on a warrant, and he was handcuffed. About 8 minutes into it, the officers learned that the warrant had been recalled, and they unhandcuffed him. While conversing with him, they obtained consent. The consent was separate from the arrest on the recalled warrant. State v. Haslam, 2009 Ohio 696, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 604 (7th Dist. February 10, 2009).*

The evidence supports the trial court’s finding of consent, and this appellate argument is really just that the wrong conclusion was reached. State v. Hodges, 195 N.C. App. 390, 672 S.E.2d 724 (2009).* See also McFadden v. State, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio February 18, 2009).*

Defendant visiting another answered the motel room door smoking a blunt, and the officer smelled and saw it, handcuffed him, and did a protective sweep of the room before getting a search warrant. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (2009)*:

Celestin argues that the warrantless intrusion into the motel room was not justified by exigent circumstances. We disagree. First, pretermitting whether Celestin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room that he had occupied for only a few hours, neither Butler’s knock on the door nor Bracken’s presence in the corridor implicated the Fourth Amendment. Thereafter, Bracken was “rightfully standing before the open doorway of the motel room for purposes of investigation” when he saw Celestin with contraband. Observing Celestin smoking marijuana created an exigency that justified the officer’s warrantless intrusion. “A classic example of exigent circumstances is the likelihood that contraband is in danger of immediate destruction.” Bracken was entitled under the exigency doctrine to enter the room to prevent the further destruction of the contraband.

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.