There is no constitutional prohibition from a state court issuing a search warrant for cell phone records of a provider doing business in the state even when the records are physically located in another state. Territoriality in the statute applies to the offense, not the object of the search. In re Search Warrant for Records from AT&T, 2017 N.H. LEXIS 167 (June 9, 2017):
We first note that the Secured Communications Act (SCA), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (2008 & Supp. 2017), provides relevant background to our analysis.
The SCA was enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, with the dual purpose of protecting the privacy of users of electronic communications by criminalizing the unauthorized access of the contents and transactional records of stored wire and electronic communications, while providing an avenue for law enforcement entities to compel a provider of electronic communication services to disclose the contents and records of electronic communications.
State v. Rose, 264 Ore. App. 95, 330 P.3d 680, 684 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (quotation and brackets omitted). The SCA outlines the requisite procedures for obtaining certain stored data from “provider[s] of electronic communication service[s].” See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (amended 2016, effective on date signed by the president). The parties appear to agree that AT&T is such a provider. One option available to governmental entities under section 2703(a) of the SCA is to obtain a “warrant … issued using State warrant procedures … by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). The SCA’s definition of “court of competent jurisdiction” includes “a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State authorized by the law of that State to issue search warrants.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3) (2012) (quotation omitted). “The SCA does not expressly address whether a state court can issue a search warrant for … content located in another state.” Rose, 330 P.3d at 685. Thus, we look to New Hampshire law to determine whether an extraterritorial warrant can issue in this case.
NH(4)[4] New Hampshire’s search warrant statute, RSA 595-A:1 (2001), does not expressly limit the circuit court’s authority to issue search warrants based upon the location of the property or article sought. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] search warrant … may be issued by any justice, associate justice or special justice of the … [circuit] or superior courts.” Id.; see RSA 490-F:18. By its plain language, RSA 595-A:1 demonstrates that the circuit court has the authority to issue search warrants. Further, as the amicus appears to recognize, the statute contains no language placing a territorial limit on this authority. See RSA 595-A:1; RSA 490-F:18; cf. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276 § 1 (West 2014) (authorizing courts to issue search warrants for property “concealed … anywhere within the commonwealth and territorial waters thereof”). We, therefore, conclude that the legislature intended to grant the circuit court authority to issue extraterritorial search warrants to the extent constitutionally permissible. Cf. Computac, Inc. v. Dixie News Co., 124 N.H. 350, 355, 469 A.2d 1345 (1983) (noting this court has interpreted long-arm statute as “coextensive with constitutional limitations”). This interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s definition of the territorial jurisdiction of our Criminal Code. See RSA 625:4 (permitting conviction for offenses under laws of New Hampshire in certain circumstances although underlying conduct occurred out of state). Had the legislature wished to place more restrictive limitations on the circuit court’s authority, it could have done so. We will not add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 169 N.H. at 204.
We find no constitutional limitation to the circuit court’s authority in this case. In its brief, the amicus appears to argue that the issuance of extraterritorial search warrants runs afoul of principles of state sovereignty. See Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214, 222, 20 S. Ct. 603, 44 L. Ed. 741 (1900) (“The sovereignty of the State of Georgia and the jurisdiction of its courts, however, did not extend to and embrace property not situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the State.”); State v. Jacob, 185 Ohio App. 3d 408, 2009 Ohio 7048, 924 N.E.2d 410, 415-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (noting that “[a]llowing one state’s court to determine when property, residences, and residents of another state may be subject to search and seizure would trample the sovereignty of states”). However, it concedes that Florida law “permit[s] searches [for records held by electronic communication service providers] on the authority of out-of-state warrants.” Indeed, Florida law expressly requires “business[es] that provide[ ] electronic communication services” to respond to a “warrant issued by another state” by producing the requested records “as if that … warrant had been issued by a Florida court.” Fla. Stat. § 92.605(3) (2003).
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)