E.D.Tenn.: Even if officers engaged in deception, the consent would have been valid

Driveby at a house called in to the police justified officer’s entry to check on people inside. That resulted in a plain view, a denial of consent, and then obtaining a search warrant. United States v. Wilson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1897 (D. Kan. January 12, 2009).*

Informant’s statement that he had seen drugs inside the defendant’s house did not have to be corroborated to show probable cause. [Indeed, it would be hard to corroborate, wouldn’t it?] United States v. Johnson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1961 (M.D. Ala. January 12, 2009).*

Defendant was told he was free to leave, but a drug dog was on the scene and was used on the car, and that was sufficient because there was reasonable suspicion at that point. This is not the same as holding a car while a drug dog is brought in (distinguishing Eighth Circuit authority the defense relied on). United States v. Norwood, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1835 (D. Neb. January 12, 2009).*

Officers responding to a call of men with guns in two cars had reasonable suspicion to stop them. Finding no guns in one did not mean there were none in the other. United States v. Howard, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2014 (E.D. Ky. January 12, 2009).*

Defendant’s wife validly consented to an entry to search for explosives. The defense argument that she was misled, even if adopted, would not carry any weight because the officers still got a valid consent. United States v. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1798 (E.D. Tenn. January 8, 2009):

Though the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Shirley’s determination that the officers advised Mrs. Jones that her husband was a suspect before she signed the consent form, even if it determined that she was not told that her husband was a suspect until after she gave her consent, the Court would not find Mrs. Jones’s consent involuntary. The officers suspected that there may be explosives and other materials for making pipe bombs in the house and therefore were not engaging in deceptive tactics or trickery when they told Mrs. Jones that they wanted to check the house to make sure it was safe. There is no requirement that a person giving consent to search a residence be told that a cohabitant is a suspect of a crime, only that they give consent voluntarily. Because Mrs. Jones understood her constitutional rights and understood that she did not have to give her consent, the Court finds that Mrs. Jones’s consent was voluntarily given and, accordingly, this objection is OVERRULED.