WI: Recovery of gun in recent shooting showed nexus for search warrant of house for ammunition

When a gun was recovered from defendant in a shooting investigation, it was a reasonable conclusion that ammunition for the gun would be found in the defendant’s house, so that showed nexus for a search warrant for the house. The shooting was recent. Defendant was arguing against what would become a bright line rule. State v. Casarez, 2008 WI App 166, 314 Wis. 2d 661, 762 N.W.2d 385 (2008):

P18 There are several factors that distinguish this case from Sloan. First, Casarez’s connection to the residence to be searched did not come from a return address on a package as in Sloan; rather, it came from Casarez himself (and his wife). Second, unlike Sloan, who reported he was leaving the state for Florida the next day, making it “unlikely that contraband would be found at the residence,” id., P32, there is no suggestion here that Casarez was going anywhere (except to jail). Third, the search warrant in Sloan sought evidence of items to show who was in control of the premises, relating to the crime of maintaining a drug house, but the affidavit in support did not present evidence to show the premises was. Id., P35. Whereas in the instant case, the search warrant was considerably narrower: “The objects of the search … may constitute evidence of crimes, to wit: 1st degree reckless endangering safety while armed and felon in possession of a firearm.” Fourth, unlike the failure in the Sloan affidavit to justify a search for evidence of a drug house, the affidavit here shows substantial probable cause tending to show that Casarez was involved in those particular crimes named, hours before his arrest. Finally, Sloan is distinguishable from the instant case because it addressed the good faith exception. We do not reach the good faith doctrine in the instant case because we have concluded that the affidavit in support of the search warrant supports a finding of probable cause. In the instant case, unlike in Sloan, the affidavit contained a reasonable inference to connect the items sought with the residence searched. Based on all of these factors, we conclude that Sloan does not control.

Videotape of defendant’s traffic stop would not be suppressed just because he had not been Mirandized at the time of the FST. He was stopped for a traffic infraction and reasonable suspicion permitted the FST. State v. Summers, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 807 (October 13, 2008).*

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