IL again: Applying Caballes and Muehler together, inquiring about drugs did not unlawfully extend stop

Reading Caballes and Muehler together, the stop was not unlawfully extended. People v. Salinas, 383 Ill. App. 3d 481, 322 Ill. Dec. 593, 891 N.E.2d 884 (2008):

Our supreme court was called upon to interpret and apply the Caballes and Muehler holdings in People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222 (2008). …

. . .

Applying the reasoning of Caballes, Muehler, and Harris to the facts at hand, we conclude that no fourth amendment violation occurred. Because defendant was lawfully seized, Officer Velez was not required to have reasonable suspicion to commence a conversation with defendant about the narcotics surveillance operation. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, [slip op.] at 16-17. (“During a lawful seizure, *** police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and are not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before doing so”). Moreover, because “the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest'” (Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837, quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984)), the conversation did not infringe on defendant’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Accordingly, as long as Officer Velez’s actions did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurred. Although defendant adamantly contends that the conversation necessarily prolonged the duration of the stop, he cites to no evidence to substantiate his claim. The record reveals once defendant was stopped, Officer Velez immediately informed defendant of the surveillance operation and revealed that defendant had been seen accepting a box from the South Trumbull residence. Defendant, in turn, immediately acknowledged that he had received a box from the residence, admitted the box contained narcotics, and informed Officer Velez that his passenger was unaware of the narcotics transaction. Indeed, at oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the conversation was “brief”.

Accordingly, the facts in this case are readily distinguishable from those present in People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 277 Ill. Dec. 658 (2003), and People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584, 817 N.E.2d 141, 288 Ill. Dec. 16 (2004), the primary cases defendant relies upon to support his contention that the police in this case prolonged the stop, because the records in Bunch and Parra revealed that the officers engaged in conversations unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stops with the defendants after they had concluded their investigations of the traffic stops. See Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 19 (finding that the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated when “the purpose of the traffic stop concluded” but “[t]he officer’s directions to defendant *** continued”); Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 589 (explaining that “[b]ecause [the officer’s] questions occurred after the purpose of the stop was completed, the questions impermissibly prolonged defendant’s detention”). Here, in contrast, the purpose of the stop had not concluded when Officer Velez commenced his conversation with defendant about the narcotics surveillance operation. Based on the facts in this case, we find the conversation initiated by Officer Velez, although unrelated to the traffic stop, did not infringe on defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly found that defendant’s motion to suppress lacked merit.

Comment: It was observed by Prof. Tracy Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than Answers, 31 Champion 34 (Nov. 2007), that Muehler has no application to traffic stops, and that complete skews the analysis.