D.Nev.: Execution of SW in def’s home and moving him to basement for questioning made it custodial subject to Miranda

“No circuit court has held that an occupant must be Mirandized as a matter of course when the police execute a search warrant in the home.” The nature of a search is, of course, police dominated by definition, and, in this case, it resulted in being custodial and without Miranda warnings, and the statement is suppressed. United States v. Warras, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149724 (D.Nev. May 18, 2015), adopted 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149716 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 2015):

No circuit court has held that an occupant must be Mirandized as a matter of course when the police execute a search warrant in the home. See, e.g., Williams, 760 F.3d at 815 (stating that no bright-line rule exists); Revels, 510 F.3d at 1275 (stating that the inquiries under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment are separate); Kim, 292 F.3d at 977 (same). The First and Ninth Circuits have determined that the best practice is to Mirandize the occupant and provide the prophylactic as he adjusts to the psychological shock of the intrusion or postpone the interrogation until a non-custodial moment. Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1086 (quoting United States v. Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2007)). This protects the suspect’s “constitutional rights and the government’s legitimate law enforcement needs.” Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d at 40. And it produces an efficient result by obviating the court’s fact-intensive determination of whether an in-home interrogation was, at some point, custodial. If best practices are not followed, the government gambles with the occupant’s constitutional rights and the possibility that evidence will be excluded at trial.

The government gambled here. It executed a search warrant in Mr. Warras’ home, decided not to Mirandize him, and created a police-dominated atmosphere that restrained his freedom of movement to the same degree associated with a formal arrest. The court’s analysis begins with the objective circumstances at the time when Mr. Warras entered his home. At that point, his grandson was subjected to a limited detention on the living room couch, six FBI agents and two information technology specialists were executing the search warrant in various locations throughout the house, and Mr. Warras’ freedom of movement was immediately restrained when he entered. An agent approached, stopped him from wandering freely throughout his home, and contacted the lead FBI agent, Agent Austin, who conducted a brief investigatory interview. Agent Austin stated that the FBI was executing a search warrant and told Mr. Warras that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

These limited restraints were not custodial. They align with the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio as applied to warranted in-home searches by Michigan v. Summers. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 698-705 (relying on Terry and holding that an occupant may be temporarily stopped or detained when a search warrant is executed to assure officer safety and preserve evidence, which are independent interests from the government’s interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects.”); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010) (restraining an occupant’s freedom of movement “identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody”); Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1087 (citing Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349) (telling a suspect that he is free to leave “greatly reduces the chance that a suspect will reasonably believe he is in custody.”).

The objective circumstances changed when Mr. Warras chose to remain in his home, despite Agent Austin’s desire. Mr. Warras was (1) isolated from his grandson, (2) restrained from moving around freely, (3) taken into the basement and not told that the questioning was voluntary, (4) subjected to subterfuge that induced self-incrimination, and (5) interrogated in a police-dominated setting for two hours. These five restraints were custodial under Craighead and Sprosty. Each of these restraints is discussed in detail below.

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These circumstances turned Mr. Warras’ home into a police-dominated atmosphere. The Ninth Circuit has stated “the presence of a large number of visibly armed law enforcement officers goes a long way towards making the suspect’s home a police-dominated atmosphere.” Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1085. “When a large number of law enforcement personnel enter a suspect’s home, they may fill the home such that there are no police-free rooms or spaces to which the suspect may retreat should he wish to terminate the interrogation.” Id. at 1084. As discussed above, the nature of the FBI’s escort and supervision of Mr. Warras deprived Mr. Warras of police-free rooms because Agent Austin “absolutely” did not want to leave Mr. Warras alone. See (Mins. Proceedings #90). These circumstances rendered Mr. Warras’ home police dominated. In Agent Austin’s own words, Mr. Warras’ home was “our [i.e., the FBI’s] controlled space.” (Mins. Proceedings #90 at 30:00).