CA2: CBP could photocopy a notebook on entry into the U.S. based on info from DEA that was RS

Warrantless copying of an international traveler’s notebook by CBP was with reasonable suspicion via the DEA. Essentially, the collective knowledge doctrine can permit a more extensive border search than would otherwise occur. Defendant was under investigation for stock fraud and was returning to the U.S. to face charges when the photocopying occurred. United States v. Levy, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17154 (2d Cir. September 29, 2015):

We also conclude that the CBP officer was entitled to rely on information provided by the DEA task force to justify the border search in this case. Official interagency collaboration, even (and perhaps especially) at the border, is to be commended, not condemned. Whether a Customs official’s reasonable suspicion arises entirely from her own investigation or is prompted by another federal agency is irrelevant to the validity of a border search, which we have held “does not depend on whether it is prompted by a criminal investigative motive.” United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006); see United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.) (“That the search was made at the request of the DEA officers does not detract from its legitimacy. Suspicion of customs officials is alone sufficient justification for a border search.”). We note, for example, that DEA or Federal Bureau of Investigation agents “frequently assist customs officials in the execution of border searches.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 232, 128 S. Ct. 831, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 147-49, 374 U.S. App. D.C. 21 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2003); Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822, 824 (2d Cir. 1985)). We see no constitutional reason to prevent these and other federal law enforcement agents from also supplying information to Customs officials in aid of a border search. Nor are Customs officials prevented by the Fourth Amendment from conducting such a search merely because it furthers another federal agency’s criminal investigation.

Levy argues that border searches conducted by the CBP, even at the prompting of another federal agency, should at least be confined to crimes that a statute or regulation specifically authorizes CBP to investigate. We recognize that CBP officers focus primarily on contraband, dutiable merchandise, immigration fraud, and terrorism. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153, 124 S. Ct. 1582, 158 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2004); Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 93. But (like other federal law enforcement officers). CBP officers are neither expected nor required to ignore tangible or documentary evidence of a federal crime. They have the authority to search and review a traveler’s documents and other items at the border when they reasonably suspect that the traveler is engaged in criminal activity, even if the crime falls outside the primary scope of their official duties. United States v. Gurr, the only other circuit court decision to have resolved this specific issue, is in accord. In Gurr, the D.C. Circuit explained:

We recognize that the primary purpose of a border search is to seize contraband property unlawfully imported or brought into the United States. However, where customs officers are authorized to search for material subject to duty or otherwise introduced illegally into the United States and they discover the instrumentalities or evidence of crimes, they may seize the same.

471 F.3d at 149 (quoting Schoor, 597 F.2d at 1306); cf. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Seljan has not cited authority under the Fourth Amendment that required the agents to disregard evidence of other unlawful activity, even if the unlawfulness had nothing to do with transporting unreported monetary instruments.”).

Because their conduct was fully supported by reasonable suspicion that Levy was engaged in a financial crime, the CBP officer in this case was entitled to inspect and copy the notebook as evidence of that crime. Neither our case law nor the applicable regulations relating to CBP officers or border searches is to the contrary, and the District Court correctly denied Levy’s motion to suppress the photocopy.