Defendant’s blanket and unsupported assertion he was a guest was not enough

Defendant who ran through the house of a friend evading the police did not show that he had standing. His blanket assertion he was a “guest” was not enough. State v. Gulley, 2008 Ohio 887, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 740 (9th Dist. March 3, 2008):

[*P25] There is no indication that Thomas Walker gave Gulley permission to enter his home or that either of the Walkers even knew when Gulley came to the house. In fact, Danielle was not even home when Gulley ran to the house to evade Officer Overdorf. Gulley ran straight into the enclosed and unlocked porch. Additionally, Gulley makes no attempt to distinguish his privacy expectation in the Walker home from the privacy expectations of the other ten to twelve different individuals who came into the home each day. Although social guests enjoy Fourth Amendment protection in certain instances, privacy does not attach per se upon a person’s blanket assertion that they are a guest in another’s home. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-99 (explaining that an overnight guest may have an expectation of privacy if their expectation is legitimate and consistent with “longstanding social custom”). Gulley fails to set forth any evidence beyond this blanket assertion.

Comment: This does not mean that the defendant has to call the putative host as a witness, although that is the best course. Standing could be proved by other things on the premises that show standing. Even “things” are not required to be shown, where, for example, the defendant is a close relative and has coming and going privileges as to the premises, but there better be evidence to prove it. The defendant can always testify as to standing, e.g.: “This is my aunt’s house, and I am there every afternoon with my cousins. I don’t even have a key but I don’t need one because the door is unlocked or there is somebody home who lets me in.” That is standing.

While defendant admitted he consented to a search of his premises after his arrest, he believed that the search was limited to drugs. Even so, in plain view was obvious evidence of money laundering. Money laundering activities had been heard on wiretaps. United States v. Oruche, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16701 (S.D. N.Y. March 5, 2008):

The Government had sufficient reason to believe that the MoneyGram terminal, computers, and documents seized were connected to the criminal activities, including money laundering, that the Government was investigating. See United States v. O’Brien, 498 F. Supp. 2d 520, 543-44 (N.D. N.Y. 2007) (seizure of computer was justified by plain view doctrine because officer had reason to believe that the computer would contain child pornography). Accordingly, Oruche’s motion to suppress items seized from [his business] is denied.