Stop of airplane was with reasonable suspicion (not “pull over,” but close)

Virgin Islands police had a tip that illegal aliens would be boarding a small private plane at a particular airport for ferrying them around. Surveilling the runway, the officer saw people boarding the plane while it was idling away from any buildings. He requested the tower to deny take off, which it did. When the plane returned to where it was idling, the officer approached and asked the pilot to step out of the plane. An occupant admitted she was an illegal. The stop was justified. United States v. Cuevas-Reyes, 49 V.I. 746 (2008).

A closed container must announce to the world its contents to be “plain view,” not just to those with specialized knowledge. Thus, a tank with telltale blue residue from anhydrous ammonia did not announce its contents. State v. Heckathorne, 218 Ore. App. 283, 179 P.3d 693 (2008), but reversed State v. Heckathorne, 347 Ore. 474, 223 P.3d 1034 (2009):

This review of what we might call “content announcement” cases compels the conclusion that, although the Supreme Court and this court have recognized the theoretical possibility that an opaque container can “announce[]” its contents “to the world,” Walker, 173 Ore. App. at 50, such containers are extremely rare. The videotape that was literally labeled with its contents did so. Ready, 148 Ore. App. at 156. We held that a particular type of glass vial did so in State v. English, 164 Ore. App. 580, 584, 994 P.2d 165 (1999), but that conclusion has been disavowed. Stock, 209 Ore. App. at 11 n 1. Although we do not now categorically foreclose the possibility that an unlabeled opaque closed container might announce its contents, we conclude that such a container must make that announcement unequivocally and “to the world,” and not merely to those who have special expertise derived from training or personal experience. Id. at 12 (Whether a container announces its contents is an inquiry “independent of *** the subjective knowledge and experience of the officer who found it.”).

Defendant’s motion to suppress trash search was denied. Defendant apparently admitted that it had to be. United States v. Stephens, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14554 (N.D. Ind. February 26, 2008)* (Comment: This may have been a motion to suppress that the client insisted on filing despite the fact the law did not support it).

Plaintiffs prevailed in their motion to suppress and filed a civil action against the officers. The case was time barred under Wallace v. Kato because it was brought more than three years after the search and arrest. A plaintiff cannot wait until winning the criminal case to bring the suit. Barnhill v. Strong, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14463 (D. Md. February 25, 2008)*:

The Court also made clear that regardless of the pendency of criminal proceedings, the tort of false imprisonment does not end when “the State drop[s] the charges against [the defendant],” but rather when “legal process [is] initiated.” Id. Accordingly, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the initiation of legal process. Id. Wallace clarified that the Heck deferred accrual rule “is called into play only when there exists ‘a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated,’ that is to say, an ‘outstanding criminal judgment.'” Id. at 1097-98 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). In short, the Court held that Heck only delays accrual when an actual conviction has been obtained by the state and that conviction would be undermined by the civil action. Id. at 1098 (“What petitioner seeks, in other words, is the adoption of a principle that goes well beyond Heck: that an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside. … We are not disposed to embrace this bizarre extension of Heck.”) (emphasis in original). The Court also dismissed the possibility that a conviction would toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 1099-1100 (dismissing the dissent’s argument for equitable tolling).