Search of defendant miles away from the premises described in the warrant was unauthorized

Reading the warrant as a whole, it was unreasonable to search the defendant miles away from the place described in the warrant. United States v. Young, 263 Fed. Appx. 710 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished):

We acknowledge the possibility that the use of the term “premises” in the command line was boilerplate, and that the omission of Young from the command line was a mere oversight on the part of the Utah judge. We are hesitant to place too great an emphasis on the command line of the warrant, standing alone, which threatens to value technical precision over practical accuracy. Cf. Angelos, 433 F.3d at 745. We therefore reaffirm that in reviewing a warrant, we should and do take into account all parts of the warrant. United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1995). Our reading of the command line as permitting only a search of the apartment, however, is strengthened by reference to the affidavit Officer Miller submitted to the magistrate judge. See United States v. Ortega-Jiminez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n affidavit … may be used to clarify with ‘practical accuracy’ the meaning of a disputed term in a warrant when the same person is both affiant and executing officer.”). As the district court recognized, “the facts submitted to the magistrate in support of Officer Miller’s request for a warrant to search Ms. Young are sparse.” Order & Memo. Decision, Aplt. Br., Appx. C, at 5. While Officer Miller’s CI claimed that he had both purchased methamphetamine from Young and observed Young travel to other locations to conduct narcotics transactions, the only information that Officer Miller’s subsequent investigation corroborated was that narcotics transactions took place at Young’s apartment. Based on this fact, it is entirely plausible that the magistrate judge who issued the warrant did not find probable cause to search Young apart from her apartment, and that the omission of Young’s person from the command line was intentional.

We therefore conclude that the warrant permitted no more than a search of the apartment, and that the search of Young several miles away from her apartment exceeded the scope of the warrant. For purposes of this appeal, we need not address the hypothetical question of whether Young could have been searched at her apartment, had her apartment been searched pursuant to the warrant.

“While we continue to recognize that the ‘ideal course’ is for a magistrate to actually review the subject photographs in child pornography cases, we likewise continue to adhere to the view that the failure to do so is not fatal to probable cause where, as here, the pictures are sufficiently described in the affidavit.” United States v. Pena, 266 Fed. Appx. 574 (9th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).