North Carolina’s satellite based monitoring (SBM) of sex offenders is designed to effect a government search of the location of sex offenders under Jones. It matters not that it is in the context of a civil case. The state court expressly ruled that Jones applies to cars and not to persons, especially sex offenders under civil law. The state court of appeals decision is vacated and remanded for reconsideration. Grady v. North Carolina, 14–593 (March 30, 2015) (per curiam) (SCOTUSBlog report):
In United States v. Jones, we held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” 565 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (footnote omitted). We stressed the importance of the fact that the Government had “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4). Under such circumstances, it was not necessary to inquire about the target’s expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s movements in order to determine if a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. “Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred.” Id., at ___, n. 3 (slip op., at 6, n. 3).
We reaffirmed this principle in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 3–4), where we held that having a drug-sniffing dog nose around a suspect’s front porch was a search, because police had “gathered … information by physically entering and occupying the [curtilage of the house] to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.” See also id., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (a search occurs “when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas”). In light of these decisions, it follows
that a State also conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.In concluding otherwise, the North Carolina Court of Appeals apparently placed decisive weight on the fact that the State’s monitoring program is civil in nature. See Jones, ___ N. C. App., at ___, 750 S. E. 2d, at 886 (“the instant case … involves a civil SBM proceeding”). “It is well settled,” however, “that the Fourth Amendment’s protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal investigations,” Ontario v. Quon, 560 U. S. 746, 755 (2010), and the government’s purpose in collecting information does not control whether the method of collection constitutes a search. A building inspector who enters a home simply to ensure compliance with civil safety regulations has undoubtedly conducted a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 534 (1967) (housing inspections are “administrative searches” that must comply with the Fourth Amendment).
In its brief in opposition to certiorari, the State faults Grady for failing to introduce “evidence about the State’s implementation of the SBM program or what information, if any, it currently obtains through the monitoring process.” Brief in Opposition 11. Without evidence that it is acting to obtain information, the State argues, “there is no basis upon which this Court can determine whether North Carolina conducts a ‘search’ of an offender enrolled in its SBM program.” Ibid. (citing Jones, 565 U. S., at ___, n. 5 (slip op., at 7, n. 5) (noting that a government intrusion is not a search unless “done to obtain information”)). In other words, the State argues that we cannot be sure its program for satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders collects any information. If the very name of the program does not suffice to rebut this contention, the text of the statute surely does:
“The satellite-based monitoring program shall use a system that provides all of the following:
“(1) Time-correlated and continuous tracking of the geographic location of the subject ….
“(2) Reporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive and proscriptive schedule or location requirements.”
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–208.40(c).The State’s program is plainly designed to obtain information. And since it does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search.
That conclusion, however, does not decide the ultimate question of the program’s constitutionality. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. The reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843 (2006) (suspicionless search of parolee was reasonable); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 (1995) (random drug testing of student athletes was reasonable). The North Carolina courts did not examine whether the State’s monitoring program is reasonable—when properly viewed as a search—and we will not do so in the first instance.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
