TX: Citizen’s arrest is governed by Texas exclusionary rule; and this one was authorized by exigent circumstances

In surveying the history of the Texas exclusionary rule, the court concludes that the exclusionary rule does apply to a citizen’s arrest. Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007):

Thus, the plain language and history of Article 38.23 lead to an inescapable conclusion: if an officer violates a person’s privacy rights by his illegal conduct making the fruits of his search or seizure inadmissible in a criminal proceeding under Article 38.23, that same illegal conduct undertaken by an “other person” is also subject to the Texas exclusionary rule. If the police cannot search or seize, then neither can the private citizen. Conversely, if an officer may search or seize someone under the particular circumstances, then the private citizen’s equivalent conduct does not independently invoke the Texas exclusionary rule, and the evidence obtained by either the officer or the private person may be admissible.

B. Searches and Seizures Conducted by “Other Persons.”

Few Texas cases have discussed the types of searches and seizures conducted by private citizens that are illegal for purposes of the Texas exclusionary rule. In Gillett v. State, this Court declined to address whether the search of a dressing room by a Foley’s Department Store security officer constituted an illegal search by a private person. Instead a majority of the Court held that the defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the dressing room because signs were posted saying that the dressing rooms were monitored. 36 Thus, evidence obtained from such a search, whether undertaken by an officer or a private security guard, was not barred by the Texas exclusionary rule.

. . .

None of these cases was explained on this basis, but this rule–that a private person can do what a police officer standing in his shoes can legitimately do, but cannot do what a police officer cannot do–would explain the outcome in each case and is consistent with the purpose of Article 38.23. We conclude that the historical rationale for including unlawful conduct by an “other person” under the Texas exclusionary statute is best explained and implemented by this rule.

. . .

Based on the history and purpose of Article 14.01(a), as well as precedent, we reaffirm the reasoning in Woods and conclude that a citizen may make a warrantless arrest of a person who commits a misdemeanor within the citizen’s presence or view if the evidence shows that the person’s conduct poses a threat of continuing violence or harm to himself or the public. It is the exigency of the situation, not the title of the offense, that gives both officer and citizen statutory authorization to protect the public from an ongoing threat of violence, harm, or danger by making a warrantless arrest.

Officers at defendant’s home with arrest warrant were able to go to the back door, too. McCloud v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 402 (October 5, 2007).*

Officer stopping defendant on a citizen informant’s complaint was corroborated by observation. Sayler v. North Dakota Dept. of Transportation, 2007 ND 165, 740 N.W.2d 94 (2007).*