GWU room search was done by an administrator and not campus police, so no state action

George Washington University room was searched for marijuana by a college supervisor with campus police (actually special police officers (SPOs) of D.C. with limited authority to arrest) standing by outside. The search was valid as campus administrative search without state action. The SPOs are only acting as police when they arrest. Here, they were standing by outside. Limpuangthip v. United States, 932 A.2d 1137 (D.C. App. 2007):

We have not articulated what is required to create a nexus with the state where the SPO has not made an arrest. However, in determining whether state action exists, we have not focused on the fact of an arrest alone. For instance, although an arrest took place in Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 362 (D.C. 1980) [cited in Treatise], we determined whether SPOs were public officers by focusing broadly on whether they were performing their “police” functions. In that case, two SPOs employed by a department store approached and questioned a customer, inquired whether she had receipts, and conducted a search after the plastic tags in her bag set off a “sensormatic device,” which the SPOs monitored. Id. at 362. We held that the SPOs were acting as agents of the state “because of the nature of their duties.” Id. We further stated that “when they are performing their police functions, they are acting as public officers and assume all the liabilities attaching thereto.” Id. We also concluded that the SPOs were significantly involved in the use of the sensormatic device because they operated and monitored it. Id. Thus, we held that there was sufficient state action to trigger Fourth Amendment protections.

. . .

In this case, the SPOs were “deputized” with special legal powers pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-582(a); however, their actions were directed and controlled by the University whose administrative official, Ms. Davis, made the decision to conduct the search. From the moment Ms. Davis telephoned the SPOs and asked them to accompany her to room 715, Ms. Davis was in control of the situation. She alone spoke to appellant and conducted the search, while the SPOs took little, if any, initiative. They accompanied Ms. Davis to room 715 at her request, produced a master key and evidence bags for her use, and held the evidence bags while she conducted the search. We have held that SPOs are not in all their actions equated with regular police officers. Woodward & Lothrop v. Hillary, supra, 598 A.2d at 1146 (citing Alston, supra, 518 A.2d at 443). Rather, the relevant circumstances surrounding the actions in question must be weighed. While the fact that an SPO wore a uniform and carried a baton and a radio, as occurred here, may be a relevant factor, see Williams, supra, 341 U.S. at 99 (fact that SPO “went about flashing his badge” relevant to whether he acted under color of law), it does not of itself amount to an assertion of state authority. More is required.

In contrast to the passive behavior of the SPOs in this case, in each of the cases discussed above in which a court found that the SPOs acted as state agents, the SPOs were actively asserting their authority from the state to a significant degree at the time of the challenged act.

Comment: So, under Lewis, if the SPOs came in the room, it would have tranformed the search from private action of GWU to state action. They obviously were trained to know their limits, and their merely standing by is not aiding in the search.