Hidden compartment was probable cause

Officer seeing heavy undercoating on a Ford Explorer while driving next to it and having seen another with sequential vanity plates was sufficient suspicion to look under the vehicle when he stopped it for a traffic offense and saw what he believed was a hidden compartment. Based on the fact the officer had stopped six other Ford Explorers with similar hidden compartments, this was probable cause. United States v. Zamudio-Carrillo, 499 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007):

This court employs a two-factor test to determine whether evidence of a hidden compartment is, by itself, sufficient to establish probable cause: (1) “the likelihood that there really is a hidden compartment” and (2) “the likelihood that a vehicle with a hidden compartment would, in the circumstances, be secreting contraband.” United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d 1235, 1238, 87 Fed. Appx. 147 (10th Cir. 2004). As to the first factor, at the time Zamudio-Carrillo was stopped by Trooper Harvey, observations made by Trooper Rule strongly supported his conclusion the Ford Explorer driven by Beltran-Lugo contained a hidden compartment. Trooper Rule testified he visually inspected the underside of the Explorer and observed that a crudely constructed metal panel had been installed around the gas line and a fresh layer of undercoating had been applied to the area. He testified he had previously seized six to ten Explorers and numerous other sport utility vehicles with false compartments beneath the floor, all constructed in basically the same way.

As to the second factor, Trooper Rule testified he could think of no legitimate reason to add a false compartment to a vehicle. Neither Zamudio-Carrillo nor Beltran-Lugo testified at the suppression hearing and neither offered any explanation for the presence of the compartment. Further, we observed in Jurado-Vallejo that “if the vehicle ha[s] a hidden compartment, it [is] highly likely to contain contraband.” Id.

Accord: United States v. Beltran-Lugo, 245 Fed. Appx. 834 (10th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

The California sexually violent predator program was challenged in a case submitted nearly 2½ years ago. The Fourth Amendment claim of how detainees were surrounded by guards for restraint was not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because it stated a claim for relief. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007):

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ policies and practices subject Plaintiffs to unreasonable searches, seizures, and unnecessary use of force. According to the Plaintiffs, they are subjected to public strip searches, retaliatory searches of their possessions, and arbitrary seizures of their personal belongings upon arrival at Atascadero. SVPs are also shackled during transport to Atascadero and during visits with family and friends. When they refuse to participate in treatment, SVPs are subjected to “red light alarms” even when they do not pose any physical risk. Moreover, SVPs are force-medicated as a means of intimidation and punishment, and for the convenience of staff.

Accepting these allegations as true, the Plaintiffs may be able to state a “clearly established” violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and thus, the claims are not appropriate for dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The watchword of the Fourth Amendment in every context is “reasonableness.” As this court held in Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997), “the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extends to incarcerated prisoners.'” Id. at 699 (quoting Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, this protection certainly extends to SVPs.

Of course, “the reasonableness of a particular search [or seizure] is determined by reference to the [detention] context.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332. There are concerns that mirror those that arise in the prison context: e.g., “the safety and security of guards and others in the facility, order within the facility and the efficiency of the facility’s operations.” Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001). But even so, qualified immunity does not protect a search or seizure that is arbitrary, retaliatory, or clearly exceeds the legitimate purpose of detention.

Under this framework, we cannot dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims. The “reasonableness” of a search or seizure is a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be determined at this stage.