Driver of a car has no standing to contest a search of the passenger that produces drugs

The drivers of two cars moved to suppres on the grounds that searches of the passengers produced cocaine. The drivers were held to lack standing to challenge their search. The mere fact the government alleged “aiding and abetting” them did not create standing. “No testimony was offered in support of the two motions to suppress that the drivers of the two vehicles had provided the cocaine to the passengers or even were aware that the passengers were couriers of the cocaine seized.” United States v. Pittman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61332 (N.D. Ohio August 21, 2007). Comment: Seems like they might be close to a judgment of acquittal without the government producing some evidence that they knew. They should take care, moreover, that the government does not take a position in the trial inconsistent with its opposition to the motion to suppress. If so, the government would be collaterally estopped or the doctrine of judicial estoppel would apply.

School officials had reasonable suspicion to conduct a drug test during the school day after plaintiff left the school, was eluding school security, came back in and refused to go to the principal’s office at first but finally did, and had bloodshot eyes and runny nose and was asked about what he was doing outside and he said “I don’t smoke weed.” Also, the drug test was an oral swab. Summary judgment for defendants granted. Ineirghe v. Bd. of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61841 (E.D. N.Y. August 22, 2007).*

Government required to put on proof that it did not use privileged information that it obtained during a search and that it possessed as a potential due process violation under Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). United States v. Warshak, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61358 (S.D. Ohio August 21, 2007):

Although the government provides assurances in its filings that it enacted procedures to protect Defendants’ privileged information, the Court finds gaps, both temporal and substantive, that can only be closed by sworn testimony of government agents that they did not use privileged information in obtaining evidence against Defendants. The Court finds well-taken Defendants’ questions concerning the amount of time that Agent Almaguer possessed privileged data, as well as concerning the fact that the government segregated in-house counsel computers, but apparently did not comprehensively screen other computers for privileged information. These questions merit a response.

The government asserts that its case is based upon proffers made by Berkeley employees and not on email communication. Should this be the case, it is not an onerous burden for the government to further produce its witnesses, who can testify that the government did not obtain their proffers by persuading them with privileged documentary evidence or information relating to conversations with lawyers.

The Court is not interested in enabling Defendants to conduct a fishing expedition by permitting the sort of discovery proposed by Defendant Chavan. The Court will not extend discovery so as to permit forensic discovery of case agent activity, short of a showing, under sworn testimony, that case agents used privileged material to support their investigation. The government characterizes any exposure that agents may have had to privileged information as incidental, harmless, and forgotten. Should such characterization be supported by credible sworn testimony, any alleged intrusion into privileged materials, although improper, cannot be prejudicial to Defendants or arise to the level of a due process violation.

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