Inevitable discovery was based on investigation that had progressed enough to get a warrant

The defendant’s consent was invalid, but the district court finds that inevitable discovery applies because the investigation had progressed to the point that a search warrant would have been sought and the printer used to counterfeit money would have been seized. United States v. Quinney, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58129 (N.D. Ohio August 9, 2007):

. . . In order that the “inevitable discovery” doctrine may be applied, it must be demonstrated by the Government that the evidence inevitably would have been acquired through lawful means had the Government’s misconduct not occurred. As noted by the Defendant, “The exception requires the district court to determine, viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.” United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 693. The Defendant also cites in his objections to United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3rd 674 (6th Cir. 1994) (“to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.”).

The Magistrate Judge distinguishes the case sub judice from other cases, including Johnson, because in the case at bar the agents had obtained independent evidence that the Defendant here was the printer of the counterfeit currency. That testimony appears from the transcript of the hearing as clear and unequivocal; the testimony revealed that the investigation by the Secret Service had located two witnesses, including Quinney’s own brother, who said the Defendant was the printer of the counterfeit currency.

Based upon a review of the case law and the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing, this Court finds that it agrees with the Magistrate Judge with respect to the inevitable discovery doctrine as applicable to this case. Given the significant experience of the agents and the possession by the agency (and therefore by the agents) of the independent evidence concerning the involvement of Quinney in the printing of the bogus bills, a search warrant would ultimately have been obtained. Therefore, the Court finds that the inevitable discovery doctrine is applicable and that it obviates the application of the exclusionary rule which, in the absence of that doctrine, would have required the exclusion of said evidence.

Comment: This form of inevitable discovery (holding that the investigation was far enough along that a search warrant would have been obtained in any event) always troubles me because it is too easy for the police officers to manufacture what they knew and when they knew it. The government, of course, carries the burden of proof on this issue, so it has to show that: the officers had independent knowledge of the thing seized by the police already existed, they were in the process of actively investigating and looking for it when the seizure actually occurred, and they had probable cause to seize what they were looking for. Only if these conditions are met can they legitimately say: “we would have gotten a search warrant if we didn’t already find it.”

False arrest and false imprisonment are separate torts because they have different elements. Reedy v. Twp. of Cranberry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58221 (W.D. Pa. August 9, 2007):

[U]nlawful seizure, also known as false arrest, and false imprisonment are recognized as separate torts with different elements. The elements of unlawful seizure/false arrest are 1) an arrest made without probable cause or 2) one made by someone without privilege to arrest. The elements of false imprisonment are 1) the detention of another where 2) such detention is unlawful. … The basis for false arrest is the arrest itself, whereas the basis for false imprisonment is the detention that follows the false arrest. Because these causes of action require different elements and protect against different harms, defendants’ attempt to dismiss Count Three is misplaced.