Forfeiture count in indictment justified seizure of defendant’s vehicle

A count for forfeiture in the indictment justified a warrantless seizure of defendant’s vehicle. “Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that there was probable cause to support the warrantless seizure of the Tahoe and that the subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was proper. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967) (holding that, when a vehicle is seized for forfeiture purposes, a warrantless inventory search can be made); United States v. Alvarez, 833 F.2d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that, once a vehicle is seized for forfeiture, it can be searched without a warrant).” United States v. Melvin, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 13, 2007)* (unpublished).

Defendant officers prevailed after a four day trial. They could detain those present during the execution of a warrant. Syfu v. Cooke, 234 Fed. Appx. 763 (9th Cir. 2007)* (memorandum):

The district court’s instructions were consistent with our holding in Dawson, where we held that an officer may detain a building’s residents during a search “so long as the officer conducts the detention in a reasonable manner.” Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (“An officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff arrested with a friend who had burglarized a tire store and had tires in his truck survived summary judgment. There was reasonable suspicion for a stop and probable cause for an arrest of the friend but not the plaintiff. Grindling v. Loo, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50757 (D. Haw. July 12, 2007):

The simple fact that Grindling was standing next to a truck containing suspected stolen goods, speaking to the driver of that truck, while in a public park that is not described as being particularly known for this type of criminal activity, is insufficient to alert a reasonably prudent police officer to conclude that Grindling had committed a criminal offense, without more information as to Grindling’s behavior. Grindling’s presence at the park is easily justified as innocent–two acquaintances meeting by chance at a park. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (holding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop when they detained two men who were walking away from each other in an alley in an area known for drug trafficking because “the … activity was no different from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood”); ….