Particularity: When the description given is the best the police can do under the circumstances, the warrant is not imprecise

Defendant had been harassing his 81 year old neighbor, and various acts of vandalism had occurred which the police linked to defendant. Oil and a powder laced with said were found on her property. A search warrant was obtained by the police for what defendant would have been putting on the property, and that led to an intense search of the property into drawers and closets. An illegal fiream and silencer were found. Defendant moved to suppress over the imparticular description of “any oil” and it was granted. The government countered that the description “any chemical” was sufficient. The impossibility of a better description by the police made the description used sufficient. United States v. Klebig, 228 Fed. Appx. 613 (7th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

In this case, the officers did not know exactly what chemicals Klebig had used to sabotage his neighbor’s house. Some of the chemicals were liquid–for instance, the chemicals sprayed over the fence on the house–while others were powder, like the white powder found on the lawn mower. The magistrate judge, in its recommendation adopted by the district court, believed that “caustic chemicals” was a more apt description. Without that limitation, the judge concluded that the “any chemicals” category would justify the seizure of “the sodium chloride in the salt shaker” and the “acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) in the medicine cabinet.” However, contrary to the magistrate judge’s analysis, a reasonable officer would not read the “any chemicals” category as justifying the seizure of anything that could be expressed with a chemical name. Nor does it seem that the adjective “caustic” would add much to the meaning of the warrant, given the unique circumstances of this case, namely that many household chemicals, if misused, could inflict damage to lawns or paint. Since a detailed particularity was impossible in this case, the generic language “any chemicals” was therefore sufficient for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Question during traffic stop “Do you have any weapons or other illegal items in your vehicle?” was, as to weapons, legitimate, if not “advisable.” The question about “illegal items” did not prolong the stop. Defendant’s answer “Not that I know of” was curious enough to justify further questions. United States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2007):

Detective Baxter’s second question, “may I search,” also did not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Again, the key inquiry is whether Defendant’s detention was reasonable. Patterson, 472 F.3d at 776. Detective Baxter asked for consent to search the vehicle as a follow-up question to his original question regarding the presence of weapons or other illegal items in the vehicle. Because Defendant answered the first question with the equivocal response of “not that I know of,” and because the possible presence of weapons in the vehicle posed an immediate danger, Detective Baxter reasonably asked whether he could search the vehicle. Indeed, Defendant’s equivocal response to Detective Baxter’s first question engenders the notion that weapons may be in the vehicle but Defendant does not necessarily know of any.

Accord: United States v. Hernandez-Torres, 234 Fed. Appx. 752 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

We reject Hernandez-Torres’s argument that Trooper Moonin unlawfully prolonged the stop and broadened the scope of questioning by asking him whether he was carrying contraband. Even if we assume that the stop was not a consensual encounter after Trooper Moonin returned Hernandez-Torres’s paperwork and told him he was free to leave, see United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), we conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the decision to prolong the stop and broaden the scope of questioning.