When is a strip search not a strip search? When it happens on the floor of a convenience store

Ohio finds that a strip search of an armed man on the floor of a convenience store that produced crack cocaine was not unreasonable under the circumstances [by just calling it not a strip search]. State v. Gillis, 2007 Ohio 3456, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3200 (2d Dist. July 6, 2007):

[*P4] Gillis was apprehended inside the store, and during a pat down, a knife was removed from Gillis’ pocket. Gillis was handcuffed due to recovery of the knife. House continued checking the area between Gillis’ buttocks and felt a hard object there which was in fact crack cocaine. House worked the crack cocaine up to the waist band of Gillis’ pants and then removed it with a plastic bag provided by the store clerk.

[*P5] Davidson, age 11, and McShann, age 15, testified that they were in the store when the pat down occurred. According to the boys, once Gillis was handcuffed, he was put on the floor and his sweatpants and underwear were pulled down. Davidson and McShann testified that they observed one of the officers retrieve something from Gillis’ “butt.” McShann testified that the officer made jokes; “When he was pulling whatever he *** pulled out of his butt. He was like he having a baby. It’s a boy.”

. . .

[*P16] The trial court determined that the officers did not conduct a strip search of Gillis and that “the defendant was not stripped naked or embarrassed in that manner.” Given the events that the officers witnessed, Gillis’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated; the officers witnessed Gillis’ participation in what they believed to be a drug transaction, Baker told them he had purchased drugs from Gillis and that Gillis still had crack on his person, Gillis attempted to flee from the officers, and he was armed with a knife. We defer to the trial court judge who is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the officers and the boys who testified. Since Gillis’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by a strip search, the trial court did not err in overruling Gillis’ motion to suppress. Gillis’ first assignment of error is overruled.

Reasonable suspicion for a stop existed because the defendant’s conduct and method of parking led the officer to conclude that the defendant was waiting in a getaway car parked near a bank with the engine running. United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2007):

Given these standards, we believe that Detective Reyna had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. Riley’s car. The information in Detective Reyna’s possession, as assessed by an experienced officer, supported the reasonable suspicion that Mr. Riley had committed a crime at the Blackhawk State Bank and therefore justified the stop of Mr. Riley’s vehicle. Detective Reyna had observed a car in an adjacent parking lot, which was backed into its space in the lot. There was a man sitting in the driver’s seat of the car, the car engine was running and the driver was focused on the entrance of the bank. Detective Reyna testified that, in his experience investigating bank robberies, it was common for perpetrators to park in lots close to banks, but not in the bank parking lots. Furthermore, the fact that the Lincoln was backed into the parking space and that the driver was focused on the bank indicated to him that the Lincoln was a “getaway” car. R.20 at 8. Case law from this court notes similar behavior by individuals involved in criminal activity at banking institutions.

Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief for putting a recording device on a jail telephone system without warning the participants in the calls that they would be recorded. Walden v. City of Providence, 495 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. R.I. 2007).