“Protective sweep” has come into the lexicon of vehicle frisks for weapons

As I noted here on July 1st, the “protective sweep” doctrine, developed for a sweep of houses or rooms to look for others who could pose a threat to the officer (Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)), has lended its name to the “vehicle frisk” for weapons (Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)), or at least the cases are starting to use that phrase.

I’m not the guardian of the Holy Grail of the Fourth Amendment; I’m just a reporter and commentator of what is going on, and this is going on. We might as well accept it: the phrase is here to stay. Let’s just get over it and agree that a “Long vehicle frisk for weapons” can be called a “protective sweep,” too. The rationale and scope are the same: neutralizing potential threats, not searching for evidence. It seems natural. Fourth Amendment purists might disagree with the usage, but I’m not, as long as the place being “frisked” or “swept” is clearly defined, capable of harboring or concealing something or someone that poses a potential threat, and it does not become a ruse for a vehicle search.

Today’s posting is United States v. Brinsen, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47413 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2007), involving a car stopped for loud music:

At the time the officers decided to ask Morris and Brinsen to leave the car and to do a protective sweep of the car, the officers’ suspicions were raised by the following facts: (1) there was excessively loud music coming from the vehicle, which was a violation of City of Richmond Ordinance No. 18-1(a)(11) and 18-2; (2) the vehicle was being driven in a high crime area at night; (3) the passenger, Brinsen, was not wearing a seat belt, which is an offense for which he can be charged and issued a summons; (4) when the officers initiated the traffic stop, the vehicle did not stop immediately but proceeded to the parking lot of a McDonald’s several blocks away and into a parking space as if the driver did not see or hear the police car behind him or in an effort to convince the officers that the driver and passenger did not believe they had committed any offense; (5) the officers smelled the strong odor of air freshener and saw the can of air freshener on Brinsen’s lap, often an indication that the occupants are trying to hide the smell of marijuana; (6) both the driver and passenger were reluctant to provide identification and to answer questions regarding identifiers, such as a license or other identification card or social security number; (7) the driver asked several times, although he had already been told, why they were being pulled over; (8) the driver did not comply with the officer’s instructions to get out of the car, but instead telephoned someone and told that person that the police were going to search the car; (9) both the driver and the passenger were nervous, fidgety, and evasive, and Brinsen would not look at the officers; and (10) the officers could smell the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the car, after the smell of the air freshener dissipated. All of these facts “taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect[s] [in this case were] dangerous and [that] the suspect[s] may gain immediate control of weapons.” There was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

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