Officer yelling “gun” and ordering people to freeze is when stop occurred; dissent finds stop potentially racially motivated

District Court erred in concluding that there was reasonable suspicion at an earlier time that the Court of Appeals finds, but it is not reversible error. Officer shouting “Gun” and drawing weapon effected a stop because no reasonable person would believe he was free to go. United States v. Goddard, 377 U.S. App. D.C. 66, 491 F.3d 457 (2007):

We disagree with the district court that the stop happened “as soon as the police officers drove up to the gas station.” … Moreover, the fact that the car halted in the gas station’s entrance way does not suggest that a reasonable, innocent pedestrian would have felt unfree to leave.

Nor did the stop occur when the police exited their car and began to approach Goddard and the other three men. Admittedly, some of the circumstances are suggestive of a stop, including that four officers were present–all with guns and handcuffs showing and wearing identifiable MPD jackets and badges–and that the officers “jumped out” of the car. Tr. of June 21, 2004 Hr’g at 58. But the presence of multiple officers does not automatically mean that a stop has occurred.

Based on the record before us, the stop occurred when one of the officers yelled “gun” and told Walker to return to the group. We have no doubt that a reasonable person would feel unfree to leave upon hearing officers seven or eight feet away yell “gun”–a statement sure to arouse the concern of all officers and civilians in the immediate area–and order one of his companions to return. See Wood, 981 F.2d at 540 (finding stop where officer ordered defendant to stop); United States v. Alarcon-Gonzalez, 73 F.3d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding seizure where officer ordered defendant’s coworker to “freeze” when individuals “were only five feet apart and … obviously working together”).

Dissenting, Judge Janice Rogers Brown wrote: “As a result, what we are now tempted to enforce is not Terry but the rule that, in a high-crime neighborhood, being young, male, and black creates reasonable, articulable suspicion.”

Reasonable suspicion was present, primarily from the occupants of the car not having their stories straight as to where they were going. United States v. Orta, 228 Fed. Appx. 633 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)*:

Within the first twelve minutes of the stop, the trooper observed (1) the vehicle’s California license plate, (2) a single key on the key ring in the ignition, (3) three cell phones on the center console, (4) Orta’s Washington driver’s license, (5) an insurance card presented by one of Orta’s passengers which did not list the stopped vehicle, and (6) inconsistent statements between Orta and a passenger about the length of their intended stay in St. Paul as well as their inability to provide specific information about their trip destination.

Search incident that occurred before arrest was valid where there was probable cause. United States v. Dotson, 246 Fed. Appx. 897, 2007 FED App. 0411N (6th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.